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A STUDY OF BIG FIELD MULTIVARIATE CRYPTOGRAPHY
Ryann Cartor
May 17, 2019
As the world grapples with the possibility of widespread quantum comput-
ing, the cryptosystems of the day need to be up to date. Multivariate Public Key
Cryptography is a leading option for security in a post quantum society. One goal
of this work is to classify the security of multivariate schemes, especially C∗ vari-
ants. We begin by introducing Multivariate Public Key Cryptography and will then
discuss different multivariate schemes and the main types of attacks that have been
proven effective against multivariate schemes. Once we have developed an appropri-
ate background, we analyze security of different schemes against particular attacks.
Specifically, we will analyze differential security of HFEv− and PFLASH schemes.
We then introduce a variant of C∗ that may be used as an encryption scheme, not
just as a signature scheme. Finally, we will analyze the security and efficiency of
a (n, d, s, a, p, t) scheme in general. This allows for individuals to generally discuss
security and performance of any C∗ variant.
v
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CHAPTER 1
AN INTRODUCTION TO CRYPTOGRAPHY
In order to illustrate the basic concepts of cryptography, we will introduce
characters Alice, Bob, and Charlie. Alice and Bob want to have a private conver-
sation, while Charlie wants to spy on them. In order to keep the contents of their
conversation secret, Alice and Bob may turn to cryptography to exchange encrypted
messages. Alice and Bob have many choices when deciding upon a cipher code. One
of the first things they must decide is if they will use a private key or a public key
to encrypt. In private key cryptography, both parties have enough information to
encrypt and decrypt. Because of this, the way that messages are encrypted is kept
private.
Private Key Toy Example: Alice comes up with the secret encryption code
C ≡ P + 3 mod 26. This would mean X 7→ A, Y 7→ B,Z 7→ C,A 7→ D, etc.
Through secret channels, Alice sends Bob her cryptosystem. Bob encrypts his mes-
sage using Alice’s cryptosystem and sends back the message “KHOOR!” Charlie
would not know the meaning of this encrypted message, but Alice uses her en-
cryption/decryption key to know that P ≡ C − 3 mod 26, and that this message
says “Hello!” The secrecy of the encryption key is of utmost importance because if
Charlie were to gain access to the key, he would automatically be able to decrypt
messages.
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Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange The purpose of the Diffie-Hellman Key Ex-
change is to create a shared secret between two parties. Alice and Bob will want to
create a private key, but we consider that they do not have a way of sharing infor-
mation through secure channels, meaning Charlie can spy on any correspondence
between the two. The way to create this shared secret is to first decide on a prime
number p and a base element g ∈ Fp ∼= Zp. This information cannot be secretly
transmitted, so Charlie has access to the values of p and g. Now Alice will choose
some integer kA < p and computes g
ka mod p := a, and Bob will choose kB < p
and computes gka mod p := b. Alice and Bob will keep kA and kB private, but will
send the values a and b to the other party. Now Alice and Bob can let the value
gkAkB ∈ Fp be their key.
Bob will compute this value by raising the value a he received from Alice to
the power of his secret number kB.
akB mod p = (gkA)kB mod p = gkAkB mod p
Alice will, respectively, raise b to the power kA. Now both parties have the
same shared secret, while Charlie does not have enough information to find the key.
This is the basis of the Diffie-Hellman Problem, which is if you are given g, a, b ∈ Fp
to then find gkAkB . Clearly if an individual can solve the discrete log problem, the
individual could also solve the Diffie-Hellman problem. The Discrete Log Problem
is GI-hard, and it is conjectured that the difficulty of the Diffie-Hellman Problem
is equivalent to that of the Discrete Log Problem. Problems that are GI-hard tend
to be sub-exponential in complexity, but still difficult for classical computers.
1.1 Public Key Cryptography
Public-key cryptography centers around the idea of “one-way functions.”
These are functions that if you are given an input, it is easy to compute an output.
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But, if you are given only an output, it is unreasonably difficult to invert the function
without additional information.
The Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange creates a shared secret where the key and
the shared secret are kept private. Public key schemes may be used for encryption in
order to create a shared secret, where the encryption key is public. In practice, one
individual may create a random string of numbers, use a public key to encrypt that
random string, and then send the encrypted random message to the other party who
may then decrypt the cipher-text to understand the original string. The random
string is thus the two parties’ shared secret. Using our characters, we say that
Alice creates one way functions, which she uses to create her public key. Both Bob
and Charlie can see the public equations. Bob encrypts his message, it looks like
gibberish to Charlie, but Alice uses secret information only she knows to decrypt
Bob’s message
Signature Verification We can also use cryptosystems to guarantee the authen-
ticity of a message. To describe how a scheme may be used for signature verification,
we will again say that Alice and Bob would like to communicate, but now we will
say that Charlie may try to send Bob information disguised as Alice. To defend
against this, Alice and Bob will agree upon a signature scheme for their correspon-
dence. Alice will create a public key P , and Alice and Bob will agree that Alice’s
signature will be the preimage of some certificate y. Alice created the public key, so
she is able to compute P−1(y) := x. She will write her message, sign it as x, and
send it to Bob. Bob will receive her message, compute P (x) = y, and he will know
the message came from Alice. If Charlie only knows that Alice is supposed to sign
with the preimage of y, he will not know how to compute that using Alice’s public
key.
3
Hash Functions Hash functions are another way to provide security against mes-
sage tampering. A hash function is a function, h, that will in general have the
following properties:
• Collision free, meaning that if messages x1 6= x2, then h(x1) 6= h(x2).
• The same message x will always result in the same hash value h(x).
• Small changes in the message should result in major changes in the hash value.
So if x1 and x2 are similar, h(x1) and h(x2) are not.
• It is infeasible to guess x given h(x)
• Messages can be of variable length, while all hash values will have a fixed
length.
We can see that generally speaking, a hash function is a function that pseudo-
randomly assigns a message to a hash value, and that will always follow that as-
signment once it has been made. Well known hash functions include SHA functions
(0 through 3), RIPEMD-160, BLAKE2, Whirlpool, and more.
To illustrate how hash functions may be used, consider the following scenario.
Bob would like to send Alice a message. After Alice receives the message, she wants
to make sure the message she is reading is actually what Bob sent, and that Charlie
has not tampered with or altered the message in any way. In order to protect
against outside tampering, Alice and Bob may choose to use a hash function.
The hash function is used along with the Bob’s public key. Bob will send
Alice (x, v) = (x, P−1(h(x))), and then Alice can check that P(v)=h(x). In order
for Charlie to trick Alice, he would have had to find values x and v such that
P (v) = h(x). But, only Bob has access to the information necessary to invert P ,
and it would be infeasible for Charlie to guess a message x′ such that h(x) = h(x′).
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1.1.1 RSA
The public key cryptosystem RSA (named after authors Rivest, Shamir, and
Adleman) was introduced in 1978 and is still widely used today. The security of
this scheme is based on the difficulty of factoring large numbers into their prime
factors. It is an open question whether breaking RSA has the same difficulty as the
factoring problem.
We will consider the hypothetical situation that Alice and Bob would like to
secretly converse in order to demonstrate how RSA works. Alice decides to create a
public key to use for encryption. To do this, she first chooses two prime numbers, p
and q, and computes n = pq. Alice will then choose some large integer d such that
gcd(d, ϕ(n)) = 1, where ϕ(n) = (p − 1)(q − 1). Finally, she will find some e such
that e · d ≡ 1 mod ϕ(n). Clearly, this means e · d = kϕ(n) + 1 for some k.
The reason behind computing integers e and d is to create a multiplicative
inverse for decryption. It is clear that Zn has zero divisors when n is not prime,
but we can consider the unit group (the set of all invertible elements) of Zn. We
will denote the unit group of Zn as Un. For primes p and q, where n = p × q,
Un ∼= Up × Uq, where Up has size p − 1, and Uq has size q − 1. Thus, Un has size
ϕ(n) = (p− 1)× (q − 1). So for any x ∈ Un, xϕ(n) = (1 mod n).
If Bob wants to send Alice the message M (represented as an integer between
0 and n−1) he will compute C ≡M e (mod n). Once Alice receives the cipher text
C, she computes
Cd = (M e)d = Mkϕ(n)+1 = (Mϕ(n))kM
Cd ≡M (mod n)
and she then understands the original plain text. Adversary Charlie only sees C, n,
and e, and is unable to find any multiplicative inverse d without knowing the prime
factors of n.
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1.2 Post Quantum Cryptography
In 1994 Peter Shor developed a polynomial-time algorithm that computes the
prime factorization of a number on quantum computers. This algorithm will render
RSA and similar schemes useless when quantum computing becomes prevelant.
Post-quantum cryptography focuses on schemes where there is no clear quantum
advantage.
1.3 Multivariate Cryptography
A specific subset of post-quantum cryptography is multivariate cryptogra-
phy. Multivariate cryptosystems are composed of systems of quadratic equations,
and the security of these schemes is based on the MQ-problem. The MQ-problem is
the problem of solving systems of quadratic equations over a field. This problem is
known to be NP-hard, which suggests it will be difficult even for quantum comput-
ers. The “one-way functions” used to construct multivariate schemes are created
by function composition. Composing multiple easily invertible maps results in a
function that is difficult to invert without knowing each of the individual functions.
6
CHAPTER 2
BIG FIELD MULTIVARIATE SCHEMES
2.1 Introduction to Big Field Schemes
Many multivariate schemes make use of the fact that given a finite field
Fq and a degree n extension K, then K is an Fq-algebra. Schemes utilizing this
structure are known as “big field” schemes.
By choosing a vector space isomorphism φ : Fq → K, we are guaranteed
an equivalence between systems F and f , where F is a set of n polynomials in n





qi+qj , x ∈ K.
This equivalence is given by F = φ−1 ◦ f ◦ φ
To hide the structure of an easily invertible map F , the standard technique
is to apply a morphism of polynomials, essentially choosing random linear maps
that mix the input and output spaces of the central map. Formally, we define these
morphisms as follows.
Definition 1. A polynomial morphism between two systems of polynomials is a pair
of affine maps (T, U) such that G = T ◦F ◦U . If both T and U are invertible, then
the morphism is said to be an isomorphism and F and G are said to be isomorphic.
Thus, for big field schemes, the construction of a public key can be summa-
rized with the following diagram.
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Matsumoto and Imai introduced the first massively multivariate cryptosys-
tem now known as C∗ at Eurocrypt ‘88, [1]. The C∗ scheme is a big field con-
struction in which the central map f : K → K is the Fq-quadratic monomial map
f(x) = xq
θ+1. We call this function Fq-quadratic because it is the product of two
Fq-linear terms (xq
θ
and x). In order to guarantee that this function has an inverse,
it is required that gcd(qθ+1, qn − 1) = 1. The central map f is hidden by a poly-
nomial morphism. In this case, the affine maps T and U both map from Fnq to Fnq .
Thus the public key is given by P = T ◦ φ−1 ◦ f ◦ φ ◦ U .
Encryption of a plaintext x ∈ Fnq is accomplished by evaluating the public
polynomials P at x. Decryption is accomplished by inverting each of the three
component maps individually. The inversion of v = f(u) is performed by solving
h(qθ + 1) = 1 mod (qn − 1), and calculating u = vh. The original intention for the
C∗ scheme was encryption, but it is also useful for digital signatures.
2.2.1 C∗ Toy Example
Creating the public key In order to complete a toy example, we must first
choose our private information. We will let q = 2, which will make our base field
F2 = GF (2). We can choose K to be a degree n = 5 extension of Fq, defined as
K = F/〈x5 + x2 + 1〉. We will choose our central map f to be f(x) = x23+1. To
create our public key, we will consider the input vector x = [x1, x2, x3, x4, x5]
> ∈ F52.
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1 1 0 0 1
1 1 0 1 0
0 1 1 1 0
1 0 0 1 1




0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
0 1 1 0 1
0 1 0 1 1
1 0 0 1 1

First we compose our input vector with our map U , which gives:
Ux =

x1 + x2 + x5
x1 + x2 + x4
x2 + x3 + x4
x1 + x4 + x5
x1 + x2 + x4 + x5

We can then write Ux as an element of the extension field by composing Ux with
our vector space isomporphism φ. Let β be a primitive element of the extension
field. Then, we can define:
φ◦U(x) = (x1+x2+x5)+(x1+x2+x4)β+(x2+x3+x4)β2+(x1+x4+x5)β4+(x1+x2+x4+x5)β5
Now that we have mixed our input values with our affine map U and found
the extension field representation of this information, we can evaluate our central














(x1 + x2 + x5) + (x1 + x2 + x4)β + (x2 + x3 + x4)β
2 + (x1 + x4 + x5)β
4
+ (x1 + x2 + x4 + x5)β
5
)23(
(x1 + x2 + x5) + (x1 + x2 + x4)β
+ (x2 + x3 + x4)β
2 + (x1 + x4 + x5)β





(x1 + x2 + x5) + (x1 + x2 + x4)β
23 + (x2 + x3 + x4)β
2·23 + (x1 + x4 + x5)β4·2
3
+ (x1 + x2 + x4 + x5)β
5·23
)(
(x1 + x2 + x5) + (x1 + x2 + x4)β
+ (x2 + x3 + x4)β
2 + (x1 + x4 + x5)β
4 + (x1 + x2 + x4 + x5)β
5
)
=(x4x5) + β(x1x3 + x2x4) + β
6(x1x3) + β
7(x1x2 + x4x5) + β
8(x3x4 + x5)












+ β30(x1x2 + x4 + x1x5)
The next step will be to find a base field representation of this element in the
extension field. In order to use φ−1, we require all of the β terms to be expressed
with degrees less than 5. Because β is a primitive element, then we know that
β5 + β2 + 1 = 0 (from our definition of K). This gives us the relationship that
β5 = β2 + 1. We can use this information to find other relations, for example,
β6 = β3 + β. We can also use field equations to simplify the expressions. Because
F2 = GF (2) we know that x = −x, 2x = 0, and xj = x for each x ∈ F. Using this






=x4x5 + x3x4 + x5 + x2x3 + x2x4 + x2x5 + x2 + x3 + x1x4 + x1x5
+ β(x3x4 + x3x5 + x2 + x3 + x1x4 + x1x2 + x4 + x1x5)
+ β2(x1x2 + x4x5 + x3x4 + x5 + x2x4 + x1)
+ β3(x1x3 + x5 + x2x4 + x3x5 + x1 + x2x3 + x1x5)
+ β4(x4x5 + x3x4 + x2x4 + x2 + x2x3 + x4 + x1x5)
The quantity φ−1(f(φ(Ux))) is
x4x5 + x3x4 + x5 + x2x3 + x2x4 + x2x5 + x2 + x3 + x1x4 + x1x5
x3x4 + x3x5 + x2 + x3 + x1x4 + x1x2 + x4 + x1x5
x1x2 + x4x5 + x3x4 + x5 + x2x4 + x1
x1x3 + x5 + x2x4 + x3x5 + x1 + x2x3 + x1x5
x4x5 + x3x4 + x2x4 + x2 + x2x3 + x4 + x1x5

We compose this with our map T to get the public key:
P (x) =

x1x3 + x2x3 + x2x4 + x1x5 + x3x5 + x1 + x5
x2x3 + x2x4 + x3x4 + x1x5 + x4x5 + x2 + x4
x2x3 + x1x4 + x3x4 + x3x5 + x1 + x3 + x5
x1x2 + x1x3 + x1x4 + x1x5 + x4x5 + x1 + x3 + x5
x1x3 + x2x3 + x1x4 + x2x4 + x1x5 + x2x5 + x3x5 + x1 + x3 + x4

To encrypt To encrypt a vector x, you will evaluate P at x. For a specific
example, lets say that x =
[
1 1 0 0 1
]>
. Then P (x) =
[
1 1 0 0 0
]>
.
To decrypt Let P (x) = y. Then, given y, you will compute
U−1 ◦ φ−1 ◦ f−1 ◦ φ ◦ T−1y
to get x.
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2.2.2 Break of C∗
C∗ was broken by Patarin in 1995 in [2] using linearization equations. The
goal of the attack is to use the known quadratic equations to discover linear rela-
tionships between the plaintext and cipher text variables.
The first step of the attack is to denote v = uq
θ+1. Notice, v, u ∈ K, so
we can consider u = φ(x1, . . . , xn) and v = φ(y1, . . . , yn). Once this relationship is
established, the next step is to raise both sides to the qθ − 1 power, which results
in vq
θ−1 = uq
2θ−1. The final step in creating the linearization equations is then to




v. This equation is
Fq-linear in both plain text and cipher text variables, which renders the scheme no
longer secure.
2.2.3 PFLASH and Other C∗ Variants
After the break of C∗, modifiers were introduced in [3] in the hopes of regain-
ing security. One such modifier is the minus modifier, which eliminates r equations
from the public key. Revisiting the example from Section 2.2.1, if we were to apply
a minus modifier, we may only publish 4 of the 5 public key equations (in this case,
r would be equal to 1). C∗ schemes that have a minus modifier applied are called
C∗− schemes. One example of a C∗− scheme is SFLASH. SFLASH is a particular
parameterization of a C∗− scheme which was thought to be secure and was recom-
mended by the NESSIE consortium for smart card use. SFLASH was broken in [4]
by employing the discrete differential, which will be discussed in Section 3.2.
Another modifier introduced is the projection modifier. The idea of pro-
jection is to fix the value of d − n input variables to change the simplicity of the
central map. PFLASH, see [5], is a specific parameterization of a projected C∗−
scheme, which is used as a digital signature primitive. If we consider the projection
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modifier pid : Fdn → Fdq and the minus modifier pir : Fdq → Fd−rq , then the public key
of PFLASH is given by P = pir ◦ T ◦ φ−1 ◦ f ◦ φ ◦ U ◦ pid.
It is important to note that there is only a polynomial morphism between
the central map and the public key, as opposed to the two being isomorphic. The
morphism of polynomials problem is known to be NP-hard, as seen in [6], which
gives hope that the information lost to the public key may secure the scheme.
Verification of a signature is accomplished by evaluating the public polyno-
mials at the given signature. Signing is done by finding preimages of each of the
private maps. To find a preimage of pir ◦ Tφ−1, randomly append r values to the
message, then apply T−1 and φ. Once f is inverted, an element in the preimage of
φ ◦ U and in the image of pid is selected as the signature.
2.3 HFE
Hidden Field Equation (HFE) scheme (introduced in [7]) is a generalization
of the C∗ construction where the monomial map is replaced by a more general
polynomial with a degree bound D. Given the base field Fq and the degree n
extension K, we choose a quadratic polynomial f : K → K of degree bound D.












where αi,j, βi, γ ∈ K. The public key is then constructed via the isomorphism:
P = T ◦ φ−1 ◦ f ◦ φ ◦ U.
Inversion is accomplished by first taking a ciphertext y = P (x), computing
v = T−1(y), solving v = f(u) for u via the Berlekamp algorithm, see [8], and then
recovering x = U−1(u).
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The HFE scheme was designed to be used as an encryption or a signature
scheme. To generate a signature (or to decrypt), one computes, successively, v =
T−1y, u = f−1(v) and x = U−1u. The vector x is the signature (or the plaintext).
For verification (or encryption), one simply evaluates the public polynomials, P , at
x. If P (x) which is equal to T ◦f ◦U(x) is equal to y, the signature is authenticated
(or the ciphertext is y).
HFE was presented in the hopes of creating a scheme that is protected against
Patarin’s linearization equations. The scheme is safe from that attack, but HFE
is vulnerable against MinRank and differential attacks, which we will discuss in a
later chapter.
2.3.1 HFEv and Other Variants
The break of HFE lead to the application of modifiers in the hopes of con-
structing a secure adaptation of the scheme. Once again a minus modifier was pro-
posed, which lead to the creation of HFE−. This scheme seemed to hold promise,
but a new key recovery attack for HFE− was proposed in [9].
When using HFE as a signature scheme, another possible modification is to
add vinegar variables. The vinegar modifier adds extra variables x˜1, x˜2, . . . , x˜v into
the public key, that can be assigned random values upon inversion. The effect of
adding vinegar variables is that new quadratic terms, formed from both products of
vinegar variables and HFE variables and products among vinegar variables, increase










βi(x˜1, x˜2, . . . , x˜v)x
qi + γ(x˜1, x˜2, . . . , x˜v)
where x ∈ K, αi,j ∈ K, βi : Fvq → K is linear, and γ : Fvq → K is quadratic.
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The vector valued functions of HFEv map from Fn+vq → Fnq , unline the vector valued
functions of HFE which map from Fnq → Fnq . But, as shown in [10–12], it can be
useful to express these functions over the extension field K.
One way to create the representation over K is by augmenting an additional
n − v elements to the input of f . We can consider the input variables yˆ (vinegar
variables) and xˆ (HFE variables) and fˆ , which is now a bivariate function over K.


















Here we see an obvious distinction among the types of monomials.
The HFEv− scheme applies a minus modifier to an HFEv scheme. Just as
before, the minus modifier removes r of the public equations. This alteration is
designed to destroy some of the information of the big field operations latent in the
public key.
2.3.2 HFEv Toy Example
Creation of the public key For the purposes of this toy example, we will only
consider the central map f , and we will let U and T be identity maps. We will
choose q = 2, Fq = GF (2), K = F2/ < x4 + x + 1 >, n = 4, and v = 3. We will
define our central map to be f = xq
1+q2 + xy + yq
1+q2 , and consider β a primitive




 =(x1 + βx2 + β2x3 + β3x4)q3 + (x1 + βx2 + β2x3 + β3x4)(y1 + βy2 + β2y3)
















































+ x1y1 + βx2y1 + β
2x3y1 + β








=(x1 + y1 + x1y1 + x3x4 + x2x4 + x3x4 + x2x3 + x1x3 + y2y3 + y1y3 + x4y2 + x3y3)
+ β(x1x2 + x2y1 + x1y2 + x2x4 + x4y3 + x3x4 + x2x4 + x4 + x1x3 + x4y2 + x3y3)
+ β2(x1x2 + x1x3 + y1y2 + y1y3 + x3y1 + x2y2 + x1y3 + x2x3 + x2x4 + y2y3
+ x4y3 + x3 + x1x4 + y3 + x3x4) + β
3(x2 + x1x4 + y2 + x4y1 + x3y2 + x2y3 + x3
+ x1x4 + y3 + x3x4 + x2x4 + x4)
We will now denote the vinegar variables y1, y2, and y3 as x5, x6, and x7,
respectively. This gives us our public key P (x):

x1 + x5 + x1x5 + x3x4 + x2x4 + x3x4 + x2x3 + x1x3 + x6x7 + x5x7 + x4x6 + x3x7
x1x2 + x2x5 + x1x6 + x2x4 + x4x7 + x3x4 + x2x4 + x4 + x1x3 + x4x6 + x3x7
x1x2 + x1x3 + x5x6 + x5x7 + x3x5 + x2x6 + x1x7 + x2x3 + x2x4 + x6x7 + x4x7 + x3 + x1x4 + x7 + x3x4
x2 + x1x4 + x6 + x4x5 + x3x6 + x2x7 + x3 + x1x4 + x7 + x3x4 + x2x4 + x4

Signature Creation Alice wants to send Bob an important message, but Bob
needs a way to ensure the message he receives is from Alice. Alice creates her public
key P , and they agree upon a signature. Bob states he wants Alice’s signature to
be x where x is the preimage of y =
[
0 1 1 0
]
16
Alice will then apply random values to the vinegar variables x5, x6, x7. She
will then use her information regarding the creation of the public key to invert f ,
which is now quadratic in x̂.
Alice finds that x =
[
1 0 1 1 1 0 0
]
is a preimage of y =
[
0 1 1 0
]
,
and signs her message accordingly.
Signature Verification Bob plugs x =
[
1 0 1 1 1 0 0
]
in to P and
verifies that P (x) =
[






There are three major classes of attacks that have proved effective against
big field schemes. These classes of attacks include differential techniques, MinRank
attacks, and algebraic attacks. All of these attacks are related in some way to the
Q-rank of a scheme.
Definition 2. Given a central map f , we choose a matrix representation F of the
central map f such that
f(X) =
[





X Xq . . . Xq
d−1
]>
We call the rank of the quadratic form F, the Q-rank of f
The MinRank key recovery attack has a complexity directly dependent on the
Q-rank of the central map. The differential symmetry attack is relevant when the
Q-rank of the central map is minimal in the relevant algebra. The direct algebraic
attack has a complexity dependent on the degree of regularity of the public key
which is usually a linear function of the Q-rank. We review each of these techniques.
The subsequent chapters will focus heavily on analyzing the security of different
multivariate schemes against these attacks
3.1 Direct Algebraic Attack
The most straightforward attack of a multivariate cryptosystem is to try
to directly invert the public key via Gro¨bner bases. In this section we will define
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Gro¨bner bases and outline the process of such an attack.
3.1.1 Gro¨bner Basis
Definition 3. Let G = {g1, . . . , g`} ⊂ F[X] = F[X1, . . . , Xm] be a finite set of
polynomials in m variables over a field F; and let I be the ideal of F[X] that they
generate. We say that G is a Gro¨bner basis for the ideal I if every nonzero f ∈ I
has a leading term that is divisible by the leading term of at least one of the gi.
(Page 74, [13])
Informally, a Gro¨bner basis is a special collection of functions that generate
an ideal, I. It is important to note that this differs from our normal idea of a basis
in that the linear combinations of the functions to form elements of our ideal I are
not unique.
Many resources have been devoted to creating algorithms to efficiently find
Gro¨bner bases. Buchberger created the first algorithm to compute the Gro¨bner
basis of a set of polynomials in [14]. Later, Fauge´re created the F4 algorithm,
published in [15], which greatly improves the efficiency of finding a Gro¨bner basis.
The first step to compute the Gro¨bner basis of an ideal, is to decide on a
term ordering. You will get different solutions depending on the chosen order, so it
is important to be consistent. Common orderings include Lexicographical ordering,
Degree-Lexicographical ordering, and Degree-Reverse-Lexicographical ordering.
The process of finding a Gro¨bner basis requires the use of the S-polynomial.








where L denotes the least common multiple of the leading terms of f and g. That
is, the power product of lowest total degree that is divisible by both lt(f) and lt(g)
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Now we will consider the following process, which follows Buchberger’s algo-
rithm. Let I ⊂ F[X1, . . . , Xm] be the ideal generated by the set F = {f1, f2, . . . , f`′}.
To create the Gro¨bner basis, one would reduce the S-polynomial S(fi, fj) modulo F
until a polynomial hij is obtained that either is 0 or has leading term that cannot be
reduced (for all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ `′). In the case that hij is nonzero, hij is added to the
set F . This process continues, adding f`′+1, f`′+2, . . . to the set F , until you have a
set G = {f1, . . . , f`} such that S(fi, fj) reduces to 0 modulo G for all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ `.
This process will give you a Gro¨bner basis of I and will terminate in finitely many
steps.
Definition 5. A Gro¨bner basis {g1, . . . , g`} of an ideal I ⊂ F[X1, . . . , Xm] is said
to be minimal if all of the gi are monic and if the leading term of gi does not divide
the leading term of gj for i 6= j, with i, j = 1, . . . , l. (Page 77, [13])
Once we have a minimal Gro¨bner basis, we are able to derive a reduced
Gro¨bner basis. It is shown in [13] that every ideal of F[X1, . . . , Xm] has a unique
reduced Gro¨bner basis.
Definition 6. A Gro¨bner basis {g1, . . . , g`} of an ideal I ⊂ F[X1, . . . , Xm] is said
to be reduced if all of the gi are monic and if none of the terms of gi is divisible by
the leading term of gj where j 6= i. (Page 78, [13]).
Reduced Gro¨bner bases are unique for any given ideal and monomial order-
ing. Thus, two ideals are equal iff they have the same reduced Gro¨bner basis.
3.1.2 Attacks Using Gro¨bner Basis
As discussed in the previous subsection, the Gro¨bner basis of a set of poly-
nomials is a set of functions that generate an ideal. We will consider the set of
polynomials
p1 = y1, p2 = y2, . . . , pn = yn
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where pi represents the i
th public polynomial and yi represents the i
th coordinate
of a ciphertext. If an adversary has intercepted a secret ciphertext [y1, y2, . . . , yn]
then the adversary may try to directly solve the set of polynomials using Gro¨bner
basis techniques.
Let F ⊂ F[X1, . . . , Xn], and denote V (F ) = {x ∈ Fn : f(x) = 0,∀f ∈ F} as
the variety of the set F . Recall the set of polynomials p1 = y1, p2 = y2, . . . , pn = yn,
consider the equivalent set p1− y1 = 0, p2− y2 = 0, . . . , pn− yn = 0. We will use the
following Lemma to establish a link between p1−y1 = 0, p2−y2 = 0, . . . , pn−yn = 0
and the Gro¨bner basis it will produce.
Lemma 1. Consider two sets of polynomials F,G ⊂ F[X1, . . . , Xn]. If F and G
generate the same ideal, then V (F ) = V (G).
Proof. Let I be an ideal generated by F .
1. Show V (F ) ⊆ V (I)
Let x ∈ V (F ). Thus, f(x) = 0 for all f ∈ F . Consider fˆ ∈ I. Then, by the
definition of I, fˆ =
∑
pifi, where fi ∈ F . So we see, fˆ(x) =
∑
pi(x)fi(x) = 0,
because fi(x) = 0 for all fi ∈ F . Thus, for all x ∈ V (F ) we know x ∈ V (I).
Therefore, V (F ) ⊆ V (I)
2. Show V (I) ⊆ V (F )
Recall, F ⊆ I. Let x ∈ V (I). Thus f(x) = 0 for all f ∈ I. Let fˆ ∈ F . Then,
fˆ ∈ I. Thus, fˆ(x) = 0. Therefore, V (I) ⊆ V (F ).
3. Consider G.
Let G be a generating set of I. As shown above, V (I) = V (F ). By similar
arguments, we can show V (G) = V (I). Therefore V (F ) = V (G).
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So if we start with the polynomial system pi − yi = 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, then
we can find a Gro¨bner basis for this system of polynomials. As we have found, the
variety of the Gro¨bner basis will be the same as the variety of the original of public
polynomials. This is advantageous for an adversary because it is known how to find
the variety of a Gro¨bner basis. The first coordinate of x ∈ V (G) will be a root of the
greatest common divisor of polynomials of the basis that depends only of the first
variable. After substituting in the first coordinate of x, the second coordinate will
be a root of the greatest common divisor of the resulting polynomials that depends
only on this second variable, and so on, until all of the coordinates of x have been
found. Thus,
P (x)− y = 0 =⇒ P (x) = y.
The complexity of solving such systems relies on the degree of regularity of
the system, which can be defined as the smallest degree at which a nontrivial syzygy
producing a degree fall is generated in the Gro¨bner basis algorithm.
3.2 Differential Techniques
Differential attacks make use of the discrete differential of a function. The
discrete differential of a function f : K→ K is the bivariate function
Df(a, x) = f(a+ x)− f(a)− f(x) + f(0).
The discrete differential is similar to the derivative of a function in the sense
that it depresses the degree of a function, but the discrete differential will also
introduce another variable. For example, if you have a cubic function f , then the
discrete differential of f , Df , will be a bi-quadratic function.
Pataran’s linearization equations in [2] can be viewed as a differential attack.
Notice that the discrete differential of the C∗ monomial f(x) = xq





. If a = x then we would get Df(x, x) = 2xq
θ+1, which is equal to zero
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in characteristic two. Now consider setting v = f(u) and compute the following:






















Notice, we now have a bilinear relationship between u (plain-text variables) and v
(cipher-text variables) over Fq.
Moving beyond the direct application of the differential, discrete differentials
are the foundation of differential symmetry and differential invariant attacks. It is
useful to note that while Df is a function over Fnq , we can define Df as a matrix
on K. Notice that we can express the ith coordinate of Df , notated as [Df(y, x)]i,
in the following way:
[Df(y, x)]i = y
>Df ix
where Df is the matrix form of Df . If we consider f(x) to be the C∗ polynomial,
then Df is the n × n matrix with 1’s in the (0, θ) and (θ, 0) coordinates, and 0’s
everywhere else. This notation will help us in later analysis.
3.2.1 Differential Symmetry
Linear differential symmetry attacks attempt to find linear maps L that “fac-
tor through” the differential of the central map in an interesting way. Specifically,
the goal is to find maps M satisfying
Df(Ma, x) +Df(a,Mx) = ΛMDf(a, x) (3.1)
If such a map can be found, it allows one to “remove” a minus modifier by discov-
ering new linear combinations of the central maps that are linearly independent of
the public key.
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This technique was used in [4] to fatally attack SFLASH. We recall the
discrete differential of a function f is defined as Df(a, x) = f(a + x) − f(a) −
f(x) + f(0). When f(x) = xq
θ+1 then Df(a, x) = axqθ + aqθx. If we symmetrically
apply an element of the extension field to the inputs of the differential, we have
Df(σa, x) = σaxqθ + (σa)qθx and Df(a, σx) = a(σx)qθ +aqθxσ, where σ ∈ K. Thus
for all σ ∈ K, Df(σa, x) +Df(a, σx) = (σ + σqθ)Df(a, x).
Consider the public key of the C∗ scheme given by P = Tˆ ◦ φ−1 ◦ fφ ◦ Uˆ .
For ease of notation (for this section only) we will let T := Tˆ ◦ φ−1 and U := φ ◦ Uˆ ,
so we can denote P = T ◦ f ◦ U . We will now analyze the differential of the public
equations P . This will be computed as DP (a, x) = T ◦ Df(U(a), U(x)), where
DP : Fnq → Fnq .
Now consider symmetrically applying elements of K as we did before. We
want to apply this relation to U(a) and U(x), so we define Mσ(x) = σU(x).
DP (Mσ(a), x) +DP (a,Mσ(x)) = T ◦Df(σU(a), U(x)) + T ◦Df(U(a), σU(x))
= T ◦ (σ + σqθ)(Df(U(a), U(x))
= T ◦ (σ + σqθ)(T−1(DP (a, x))
Now let DPΠ denote the differential of a C
∗− scheme. We can consider
PΠ = Π ◦ T ◦ f ◦ U , where Π denotes the minus modifier.
DPΠ(Mσ(a), x) +DPΠ(a,Mσ(x)) = Π ◦ T ◦Df(σU(a), U(x))
+ Π ◦ T ◦Df(U(a), σU(x))
= Π ◦ T ◦ (σ + σqθ)(Df(U(a), U(x))
= Π ◦ T ◦ (σ + σqθ)(T−1(DP (a, x))
So now we have a relationship between the published C∗− key (left hand
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side), and the breakable unmodified C∗ public equations (right hand side). The
left hand side is linear in the unknown coefficients Mσ, and the right and side is
linear in the unknown coefficients of T ◦ (σ + σqθ) ◦ T−1. To match our notation in
Equation 3.1, M = Mσ, ΛM = T ◦ (σ + σqθ) ◦ T−1.
Once the new linearly independent combinations of the central maps have
been discovered, the adversary may mount other attacks (such as Patarin’s lin-
earization equations) onto the recovered representation of the scheme and break it.
This attack lead to the implementation of using a projection modifier in conjunction
with a minus modifier, leading to schemes such as PFLASH (parameters defined
in [5]).
3.2.2 Differential Invariants
Differential invariants can also be used to weaken the security of certain
schemes. Informally, a function has a differential invariant, V ⊆ K, if the image of
V under all the coordinates of the matrix form of Df lies in a fixed subspace with
the same or smaller dimension size. More formally we define the following:
Definition 7. Let f : Fnq → Fmq be a function. A differential invariant of f is
a subspace V ⊆ K with the property that there is a subspace W ⊆ K such that
dim(W ) ≤ dim(V ) and ∀A ∈ SpanFq(Dfi) it holds that AV ⊆ W.
The point of searching for a differential invariant is to try to create a linear
relationship between plaintext and ciphertext variables. If we can find a differential
invariant V , then we can establish a linear relationship using the discrete differential.
This explanation follows much of the analysis done in [12].
Assume V is a differential invariant of some function f . Then we define V ⊥
to be the set of elements x ∈ K such that the dot product 〈x,A〉 = 0 for all v ∈ V
and A ∈ Span(Dfi). In other words, we can consider V ⊥ to be the set of elements
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orthogonal to AV. Once we have found V and defined V ⊥, we may then choose
linear functions M : K→ V and M⊥ : K→ V ⊥.
Expressing the differential as a matrix we find that
[Df(M⊥y,Mx)]i = (M⊥y)>(Df i(Mx)).
Notice that M⊥y ∈ V ⊥ and Df iMx ∈ AV . So for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and ∀x, y ∈ K
we have
[Df(M⊥y,Mx)]i = (M⊥y)>(Df i(Mx)) = 0
Our next goal will be to rewrite M and M⊥. Consider Proposition 1 from [12]
which states the following:
If A,B are two m× n matrices, then rank(A) = rank(B) if and only if
there exist nonsingular matrices C,D such that A = CBD.
Now considerM andM⊥. Without loss of generality, assume that rank(M⊥) ≤
rank(M). If rank(M⊥) = rank(M), then by the above proposition, there exist
nonsingular matrices S, T such that M⊥ = SMT . If rank(M⊥) < rank(M), then
compose M with singular matrix Y so that rank(M⊥) = rank(YM). Applying
the above proposition to M⊥ and YM , we know there exist nonsingular matrices
S, T such that M⊥ = S(YM)T = S ′MT where S ′ is singular. Restating our above
result, for all x, y ∈ K
Df(SMTy,MTx) = 0.
Thus we have found a linear relationship between plaintext and ciphertext
variables using the differential invariant V .
3.3 MinRank
The first effective attack on HFE was presented in [10] and is now com-
monly called the Kipnis-Shamir (KS) attack. Their idea is to express the central
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polynomial f as a matrix in quadratic form F (recall Definition 2) over K. As the
reader easily notices, the degree bound on f implies that F has only a small block
of nonzero values and thus has low rank. We call the rank of this quadratic form
the Q-rank of f .
The attack in [10] exploits this low Q-rank property of HFE by first finding
a formula for the public key over the extension field. The next step of the attack
is to compute the matrix forms of all of the Frobenius powers of this map, and the
final goal is to find a low rank linear combination of these matrices with coefficients
chosen from K. The attack can be effective, but all of the algebra takes place in K
which can be cumbersome.
The KS attack was significantly improved for determined or slightly over-
determined schemes in [11], where the authors introduce minors modeling. The
modeling of the low rank property in the KS attack requires structures defined
over K, whereas the authors of [11] noticed that a K-linear combination of the
public quadratic forms defined over Fq also has low rank. Thus one may construct
a system of equations over the small field, resolve this system via Gro¨bner bases
over the small field, and finally recover the variety over the big field. This requires




ON THE DIFFERENTIAL SECURITY OF THE HFEv− PRIMITIVE
This chapter will analyze the security of HFEv− schemes against differential
attacks. Recall from Section 2.3.1 the definition of an HFEv− scheme. HFEv− is a


















and r of the public key equations are deleted. Much of this work has been completed
by considering the security of an HFEv scheme, analyzed in [12], and then extending
the analysis to the HFEv− scheme.
4.1 Linear Symmetry
Recall from Section 3.2.1 that a general linear differential symmetry is a
relation of the form
Df(Mx, a) +Df(x,Ma) = ΛMDf(a, x).
where M,ΛM : K→ K are Fq−linear maps.
While attacks similar to that of [10,16] exploited some multiplicative relation
on central maps of schemes with some algebraic structure over the base field, it was
shown in [17] that general linear differential symmetries based on more complex
relations exist, in general. Therefore, when analyzing the potential threat, it be-
comes necessary to classify the possible linear differential symmetries. If we succeed
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in characterizing parameters which provably eliminate nontrivial differential sym-
metric relations, we prove security against the entire class of differential symmetric
attacks, even those utilizing relations not yet discovered. To this end, we evaluate
the security of HFEv against such adversaries. We explicitly consider parameter
restrictions that guarantee the existence of only trivial differential symmetries.
4.1.1 Linear Symmetry for HFEv
In our analysis, we will begin by considering the differential of our core map.







) = Df(a, b, x, y)
By the bilinearity of Dfˆ we see that Df is multi-affine, meaning Df is affine
in each of its inputs when the remaining inputs are fixed. Evaluating this differential
we obtain




































noting that Df is a K-bilinear form. For ease of computation, we will choose




2 · · · xqn−1
]>




2 · · · xqn−1y yq yq2 · · · yqn−1
]>
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and Df is thus represented by the 2n × 2n matrix where the (i, j)th and
(j, i)th entries in the upper left n× n block are the coefficients αi,j, and the (i, j)th
entries in the upper right block and the (j, i)th entries in the lower left block are the
coefficients βi,j , while the (i, j)
th and the (j, i)th entries in the lower right block are
the coefficients γi,j. Note, that any Fq-linear map M : K → K can be represented
by Mx =
∑n−1
i=0 mix. Thus, as demonstrated in [12], under our representation we
can model M as,
M =

m0 m1 · · · mn−1
mqn−1 m
q


















consider the 2n× 2n matrix
M =

m00,0 m00,1 · · · m00,n−1 m01,0 m01,1 · · · m01,n−1
mq00,n−1 m
q



















01,2 · · · mq
n−1
01,0
m10,0 m10,1 · · · m10,n−1 m11,0 m11,1 · · · m11,n−1
mq10,n−1 m
q























For computational reference, we will label each row and column modulo(n),
i.e., each coordinate of the entry (i, j), will be represented by a residue class modulo
n. If we assume that f is vulnerable to a differential attack, then there exists a
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nontrivial linear mapping M such that the differential symmetry is satisfied. Com-
puting such a symmetry inducing map requires the solution of 4n2 highly depen-
dent, but random, equations in the 8n unknown coefficients of M and ΛM over
K. Since trivial symmetries (such as multiplication by scalars) are exhibited by
every map, we know that there exist nontrivial solutions. Even assuming unit time
for K-arithmetic operations, for realistic parameters this process is very inefficient;
with the more realistic assumption of costly K-arithmetic operations, this task is
unsatisfactory in key generation.
To make the solution of such systems of equations more efficient, we derive
the structure of the equations and develop a two step process for verifying triv-
ial differential symmetric structure. The first step involves finding equations which
only involve a subset of the variables. The existence of such equations is guaranteed
by the degree bound of the HFE monomials. This information is then bootstrapped
to eliminate many unknown coefficients of M resulting in a very small system of
equations which can be solved explicitly. We remark here that this methodology
also suggests a method for estimating the probability of the existence of a differ-
ential symmetry for the HFEv primitive. The existence of a nontrivial symmetry
corresponds to systems for which the rank of the system of equations is less than
8n. Under the heuristic that under row reduction these systems of equations behave
like random 8n× 8n matrices, we obtain a probability of roughly 1− q−1 that the
scheme has no nontrivial differential symmetry.We note that this heuristic is almost
certainly false since trivial symmetries do exist. This quantity does represent a
lower bound, however, and thus may offer support for larger base fields.
We begin by considering the entries of the matrix M
>
Df + DfM . The
contribution of any monomial αi,jx






00,1−j · · · αi,jmj00,−1−j αi,jmj01,−j αi,jmj01,1−j · · · αi,jmj01,−1−j
)
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00,1−i · · · αi,jmi00,−1−i αi,jmi01,−i αi,jmi01,1−i · · · αi,jmi01,−1−i
)
By symmetry, the ith and and jth columns of M
>
Df Df are the same as their
respective rows.
It is clear that the rows and columns associated with coefficients of vinegar
monomials as well as terms associated with mixing monomials may be represented
similarly. However, it should be noted that those terms associated with mixing
monomials will be multiplied by linear coefficients m00,∗,m01,∗,m10,∗, and m11,∗,
while coeffcients associated with vinegar variables are multiplied only by the linear
coeffcients m10,∗ and m11,∗.
The above patterns can be extended to characterize the contribution to the




qi+qj as well. We
note, however, that γ coefficients interact with entries from the lower block matrices
while β coefficients interact with coefficients from all block matrices.
Now that we have characterized the left side of the central map described


















qu+`+qv+` . Clearly, this results in
every nonzero entry, say (r, s), of our Df matrix being raised to the power of q`
and shifted along a forty-five degree angle to entry (r + `, s + `). Thus, for every
monomial in f there are two possible nonzero entries in the ith row, with possible
overlap.
This discrete geometrical interpretation of the action of M and D on the
coefficients of f is central to this analysis. A graphical representation of these
relations is provided in Figure 4.1
As in [12], the possibility of a differential symmetry can be determined by
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Figure 4.1: Graphical representation of the equation M>Df + DfM = ΛMDf






and vertical lines represent nonzero entries in M>Df + DfM while diagonal lines
represent nonzero entries in ΛMDf . We may consider this diagram as a genus 4
surface containing straight lines.
setting the matrix representation of M>Df + DfM equal to the matrix ΛMDf .
We will demonstrate an algorithm, given some specific constraints, that will help
provide secure keys to be generated automatically. Due to the structure of our
M matrix, we need to work within each mi,j matrix independently. The following
algorithm for m0,0 extends very naturally to the other 3 matrices. For clarity, all m
terms in the description below are m0,0 terms.
Let αi,j, βr,s, γu,v represent the coefficients of our monomials in our core map.
Consider the ith row of M>Df +DfM . For all w not occurring as a power of q of
our HFE or mixing monomials in f , or difference as a of powers of q in an exponent
of a monomial in f plus i, the (i, w) entry is αi,jm
qi
w−j = 0 (respectively βi,jm
qj
w−j).
Consider the rth row. For all w not occurring as an exponent of q in a vinegar
monomial or as a difference of powers of q in an exponent of a monomial in f plus
s, the (r, w)th entry is βr,sm
qs
k−s = 0. Hence, we can use those relations to look for
non-zero entries of m0,0.
After putting those relations into Algorithm 2 (listed in Appendix I), we can
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generate a set of exponents that occur in the core map for every i and r. Each set
provides a list of indices of all possible non-zero m’s. For each index not occurring
in any such set, the corresponding coefficient m must equal zero due to the fact
that there must be a coordinate in the equation M>Df +DfM = ΛMDf setting a
constant multiple of m to zero. Thus, the intersection of all sets generated produces
a list of all possible non-zero entries for the sub-matrix m0,0.
Once this list is obtained, the variables shown to have value zero are elim-
inated from the system of equations. After repeating a similar algorithm for each
of the remaining three submatrices a significantly diminished system of equations
is produced which is then solved explicitly. After running this algorithm with re-
alistic values satisfying the above constraints and matching the parameter sizes of
[53] along with using mild restrictions on the powers of the mixing and vinegar
monomials, the only non-zero value obtained is m0.
We note that it is possible that these restrictions, especially the restriction
for these experiments on the number of monomials, place a lower bound on the
number of vinegar variables required to achieve such a structure. On the other
hand, with numerous small-scale experiments without parameter restrictions and
using the full number of monomials we found that structurally the only nonzero
value for the matrix m0,0 is the m0 term.
Since we have only a single non-zero term, our m0,0 matrix is a diagonal
matrix. A similar analysis for each of the remaining submatrices reveals the same
structure. Thus we find that the only possible structure for M under these con-





Furthermore, we can prove by way of Theorem 2 from [18], that the coeffi-
cients c, d ∈ Fq.
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We note that this map induces a trivial differential symmetry. To see this,
note that the (nonpartial) differential of any bivariate function is bilinear in its
vector inputs. Thus
Dg(M [a, b]>, [x, y]>) = Dg([ca+ db, da+ cb]>, [x, y]>)
= Dg([ca+ db, cb+ da]>, [x, y]>)
= Dg(c[a, b]>, [x, y]>) +Dg(d[b, a]>, [x, y]>)
= cDg(a, b, x, y) + dDg(b, a, x, y)
= (c+ d)Dg(a, b, x, y).
(4.3)
Consequently, for the parameters provided by Algorithm 2 found in Ap-
pendix I HFEv provably has no nontrivial differential symmetric structure.
It should be noted that the restrictions provided on the powers of q of the
monomials of our f does lower the entropy of our key space and likely raise the num-
ber of required vinegar variables to a level which is either unsafe or undesirable.
However, there is still plenty of entropy with these restrictions and we obtain prov-
able security against the differential symmetric attack. The restrictions provided
are just a base line for this technique and our experiments with small scale examples
indicate that even when we insist that every possible monomial satisfying the HFE
degree bound is required to have a nonzero coefficient, the generalized algorithm
still outputs only the trivial solution. Thus we can achieve provable security with
minimal loss of entropy.
4.1.2 Linear Symmetry for HFEv−
The algorithm extends naturally to HFEv−. Every non-zero entry from the
system generated by HFEv is also in the system generated by HFEv−, but with a
few additional entries, see Figure 4.2. We choose a basis in which an example minus
projection is a polynomial of degree q2. For every ith row, we also know that for
35
Figure 4.2: Graphical representation of the equation M>Df + DfM = ΛMDf for
the HFEv with the minus modifier given by the projection pi(x) = xq
2
+ ρxq + τx.
Horizontal and vertical lines represent nonzero entries in M>Df + DfM while
diagonal lines represent nonzero entries in ΛMDf . We note that each triple of lines
corresponds to a single monomial in the central map.
any w which is not a power of α + n or β + n (where n < 2), the (i, w)th entry is
αi,jm
qj
w−j = 0. For the s
th row for all w not being a power of β + n or r + n where
n < 2, the (s, w)th entry is βr,sm
qr
w−r = 0 A visualization is provided in Figure 4.2.
Again, we can use these relations, along with the relations described in the
HFEv system, to create a list of sets of all non-zero areas on m0,0 using Algorithm 3.
Each of these sets contains indices which are possibly non-zero, thus entries not in
that set are definitively equal to zero.
By taking the intersection of all the sets, you can find the final locations of
non-zero entries for our sub matrix m0,0. In doing so, with realistic values from [19],
the only non-zero value obtained is m0. This again gives us security against sym-
metrical attacks by having M being a block matrix consisting of diagonal matrices




As discussed in Section 3.2.2, if we have a differential invariant V , then there
exists a linear relationship between plain text and cipher text variables. To deter-
mine the effectiveness of a differential invariant attack, we evaluate the liklihood
that a differential invariant exists.
Minimal Generators over Intermediate Subfield Consider the following state-
ment about the structure of the coordinate ring of a subspace of an extension field
over an intermediate extension.
Lemma 2. Let L/K/Fq be a tower of finite extensions with |L : K| = m and
|K : Fq| = n. Let V be an Fq-subspace of L. Then I(V ) has m multivariate
generators over K of the form







This Lemma is proven in [20], and will prove insightful during the following
analysis. We note that the minimal polynomials studied in [12] correspond to the
special case of the above lemma in which m = 1. Given our characterization from
Section 2.3.1 of the central map of HFEv− as a bivariate polynomial over K, we are
primarily interested in the m = 2 case of Lemma 2.
4.2.1 Invariant Analysis of HFEv
As in [12], we consider Df(SMTa,MTx), where T is nonsingular, S is a
possibly singular map which sends V into V ⊥ and M : K→ K s a projection onto
V . Without loss of generality we’ll assume that M projects onto V . Then MT is
another projection onto V . SMT is a projection onto V ⊥. An important distinction
is that for this case, the a and x above are actually two dimensional vectors over
K.Thus dim(V ) + dim(V ⊥) ≥ n.
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Theorem 1. Let K be a degree n extension of the finite field Fq. Let f be an
HFEv central map. With high probability, f has no nontrivial differential invariant
structure.


















Applying the differential with respect to the vector [x, y]>, we obtain Equa-
tion 4.2. Substituting SMT [a, b]> and MT [x, y]> into Equation 4.2 we derive:
Df(S[aˆ, bˆ]>, xˆ, yˆ) = Df(S11aˆ+ S12bˆ, S21aˆ+ S22bˆ, xˆ, yˆ).
For notational convenience, let a˜ = S11aˆ+S12bˆ and b˜ = S21aˆ+S22bˆ. Plugging these
values into the previous equation we get




































In contrast to the situation with HFE, these monomials are not necessarily inde-







qj for j ∈ {1, 2},
where rij, sij ∈ K. Clearly these expressions evaluate to zero on (xˆ, yˆ). Evaluating
4.4 modulo I(V ) (only on the variables xˆ, yˆ), we obtain:

























where dx and dy are the largest occurring powers of xˆ and yˆ, respectively. After
the reduction modulo I(V ), the remaining monomials xˆ, . . . , xˆq
dx
and yˆ, . . . , yˆq
dy
are






















The left hand sides of 4.7 and 4.6 are F-linear functions in S[aˆ, bˆ]>. Thus we can
express each such equality over F as
LS
[
aˆ0, . . . , aˆn−1, bˆ0, . . . , bˆn−1
]>
= 0
where L is an n × 2n matrix with entries in F. We note specifically that the
coefficients of L depend on V and the choices of coefficients in the central map
f . For randomly chosen coefficients retaining the HFEv structure, we expect an L
derived from an equation of the form 4.7 or 4.6 to have high rank with very high
probability, more than 1− q−n. Thus the dimension of the intersections of the null
spaces of each L is zero with probability at least 1− 2q−n.
Clearly, the condition for these equations to be satisfied is that S sends V to
the intersection of the null spaces of each such L. Thus S is with high probability
the zero map on V and so V ⊥ = {0}. This generates a contradiction, however, since
2n ≤ dim(V ) + dim(V ⊥) < 2n. Thus, with probability greater than 1 − 2q−n, f
has no nontrivial differential invariant structure.
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4.2.2 Invariant Analysis of HFEv−
The situation for HFEv− is quite similar, but the probabilities are slightly
different. Specifically one must note that since the condition of being a differential
invariant is a condition on the span of the public differential forms, under projection
this condition is weaker and easier to satisfy. For specificity, we consider the removal
of a single public equation, though, critically, a very similar though notationally
messy analysis is easy to derive in the general case.
We may model the removal of a single equation, which can be considered a
corank 1 projection, as a projection of the form pi(x) = xq + x applied after the
central map. We will show this by proving the more general statement below. This
proof was originally published in [9].
Claim 1. Let Π ◦ T be a corank a linear transformation on Fnq . There exists both a
nonsingular linear transformation S and a degree qa polynomial pi such that
Π ◦ T = S ◦ φ−1 ◦ pi ◦ φ
Proof. Let V be the kernel of Π ◦ T and let pi =MV = Πv∈V (x− v). We may call
pi the “minimal polynomial” of V because this is the polynomial of minimal degree
such that every element of V is a root. Note that |V | = qa. This is because each
v ∈ V will have 0’s in the first n− a coordinates, while the remaining a terms can
be any value in Fq. Thus we see from the definition of pi that MV (x) has degree qa





+ · · ·+ c1xq + c0x
where ci ∈ K.
Now let Bv = {bn−a, bn−a+1, . . . , bn−1} be a basis for V . We can extend Bv
into some vector B = {b0, . . . , bn−a−1, bn−a, bn−a+1, . . . , bn−1} such that B is a basis
for Fnq .
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Let M be the matrix that maps the standard basis to B. We can see that the
last a columns of the matrix representations of M−1(Π◦T )M and M−1(φ◦pi ◦φ)M
will be zero.
Observe that there exist invertible matrices A and A′, corresponding to row
operations, such that both AM−1(Π ◦ T )M and A′M−1(φ ◦ pi ◦ φ)M are in reduced
echelon form; that is:
AM−1(Π ◦ T )M =
 I 0
0 0
 = A′M−1(φ ◦ pi ◦ φ)M
Solving for Π ◦ T , we obtain
Π ◦ T = MA−1A′M−1(φ−1 ◦ pi ◦ φ)
Let S = MA−1A′M−1 and the proof is complete.
So to remove one equation, we consider Π to be a corank 1 projection, a = 1,
|V | = q1, and pi = Πv∈V (x− v) = xq + x. We have
Π ◦ T ◦ φ−1 ◦ f ◦ φ ◦ U = S ◦ φ−1 ◦ (pif) ◦ φ ◦ U
4.3 Degree of Regularity, Q-Rank, and Parameters
Further considerations for the security of HFEv− are the degree of regularity,
a quantity closely connected to the complexity of algebraic attacks, and the Q-rank
of the public key. A careful analysis of each of these quantities reveals that they
support the security of HFEv− against an algebraic attack such as [21] and against
the Kipnis-Shamir methodology and its improvements, see [10, 11].
In [22], it is shown that an upper bound for theQ-rank of an HFE component,
the number of removed equations, and the Q-rank of the vinegar component. For
Gui-96(96,5,6,6), here q = 2, n = 96, D = 5, v = 6, and r = 6, this quantity is
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roughly 15. Furthermore, in [19], experimental evidence in the form of analysis of
toy variants is provided indicating that this estimate is tight. Thus the complexity
of a Kipnis-Shamir style attack is roughly O(n3q15n).
Also in [22], a formula for an upper bound on the degree of regularity for
HFEv− systems is derived. Given the parameters of Gui-96(96,5,6,6), the degree of
regularity is expected to be 9. Further, experiments are provided in [19], supporting
the tightness of this approximation formula for toy schemes with n as large as 38.
With this degree of regularity the expected complexity of inverting the system via
Gro¨bner basis techniques is given by(




where 2 ≤ ω < 3 is the linear algebra constant. We note than an error in the
approximation of the degree of regularity can easily change this estimate by a factor
of a few thousand. Still, it seems clear that each of these avenues of attack is
unviable.
Still another attack vector is to put the entropy of the key space to the test
with techniques such as those mentioned in [23] for deriving equivalence classes
of keys. With our most restrictive instance of the key verification algorithm in
Section 4.1.2, we have a key space consisting of roughly q13n central maps, roughly
q6n of which can be seen as equivalent keys as in [23]. Thus provable security against
the differential adversary can be achieved with a key space of size far beyond the
reach of the “guess-then-IP” strategy.
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CHAPTER 5
AN UPDATED SECURITY ANALYSIS OF PFLASH
SFLASH, was thought to be secure until its break in [4] (described in Sec-
tion 3.2.1). This scheme was attacked by exploiting its differential symmetry. The
authors of [24] present a way to resist the attack on SFLASH through projection,
which produces a scheme we now call PFLASH. PFLASH is still a very fast signature
scheme and is amenable to low-power environments without sacrificing side-channel
resistance. This projected C∗− system is shown to resist differential cryptanalysis
for restricted parameters, that is, when the degree is bounded by qn/2−d, in [17] and
is fully specified with paractical parameters in [5].
Since the design of PFLASH there have been a number of cryptanalytic de-
velopments in the big field venue. The development of differential invariant attacks
in [25] and their further application in [26] are examples of advancement in this
active area. Furthermore, the improved efficiency of the Kipnis-Shamir (KS) at-
tack of [10] presented in [11] is directly impactful to PFLASH, as one can consider
PFLASH as a possibly high degree but still low rank version of HFE−.
We expand and update the analysis in [17] and [5] proving resistance to
differential and rank techniques for the vast majority of parameters, and we verify
that the provably secure key spaces are less limiting than previous works suggest.
This improvement is directly impactful, providing further assurance that attacks
based on equivalent keys cannot weaken PFLASH.
The degree bound restriction in [17] reduces the dimension of possible private
keys by a factor of more than two. Our updated differential analysis verifies the
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security of the scheme when the central map has no degree bound, and thus assures
us that very little entropy is lost in the key space when restricting to parameters
that are provably secure against differential adversaries.
In [5], an argument for the resistance of PFLASH to the technique of [11, Sec-
tion 8.2] when PFLASH is considered as a low degree projected HFE− scheme is
provided. We make this assessment more robust by also considering the possibility
of an adversary attempting to remove the projection modifier from PFLASH consid-
ering it to be a higher rank HFE− scheme. Whereas in the former case, the attack
is impossible, in the latter case, the algebraic structure allows the possibility that
the attack can succeed; however, the complexity of the attack is directly computed
and shown to be infeasible.
5.1 Updated Differential Analysis of Projected Primitive
As discussed in [17], we may assume that the projection mapping is tied to
f and consider differential symmetries of f ◦ pi where pi is chosen in a basis such
that deg(pi) = qd. Clearly, if f ◦ pi has a differential symmetry then the equation
Df(Ma, pix) + Df(pia,Mx) = ΛMDf(pia, pix) is satisfied for some M . We can
express this relation with matrix multiplication, namely
a>(Π>DfM)x+ a>(M>DfΠ)x = ΛM [a>(Π>DfΠ)x],
where Df is the matrix representing Df as a bilinear form over K, having one in








Examining this equation, we see that a>(Π>DfM)x + a>(M>DfΠ)x will
have nonzero entries restricted to certain coordinates depending only on d and
θ, see Figure 5.1. Similarly, the right hand side of the equation, Π>DfΠ, has a
structure dependent upon d and θ, see Figure 5.2. Notice, the graphs may look
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different depending on the choice of θ and d.
d




Figure 5.1: The shape of the
matrix representation over K of
Df(Ma, pix) + Df(pia,Mx). Shaded
regions correspond to possibly
nonzero values.
d




Figure 5.2: The shape of the matrix
representation of ΛMDf(pia, pix) over
K. Shaded regions correspond to pos-
sibly nonzero values. The shape of the
matrix representation
The strategy for finding conditions on pi, M and ΛM for the existence of such
a symmetry is then to find coordinates in which one side of this matrix equation
is zero while the other side involves only a single unknown coefficient of M or ΛM .
While this system of equations is nonlinear in the coefficients of pi, it is linear in
both the unknown coefficients of M and those of ΛM .
The system contains many more equations than variables, but certainly gen-
erates a positive dimensional ideal. The reason is that for any fixed pi, M = api for
any a ∈ Fq generates a solution. On the other hand, for a fixed pi and a fixed θ, the
above system becomes linear with the number of nonzero equations depending on
both d and θ. Even in the best case, the number of equations is far larger than the
number of variables. Since the coefficients of pi are the only source of randomness for
this system of linear equations, the great number of equations are not independent
in a probabilistic sense. Therefore, probabilistic arguments are difficult, though
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extensive experiments show that the solution space is generally one dimensional.
Luckily, we can do better by bootstrapping the result of [17]. Specifically,























Consider the special case of Lemma 3 when ρ = −θ. After applying this
map to the output of Df, the nonzero terms, originally in the (θ, 0) and (0, θ)
coordinates, are transported to the (0,−θ) and (−θ, 0) coordinates, respectively.
This observation leads to the following theorem, revealing that most parameters of
PFLASH are provably secure against a differential adversary.
Theorem 1. Let f(x) = xq




linear. Suppose that f satisfies the symmetric relation:
Df(Ma, pix) +Df(pia,Mx) = ΛMDf(pia, pix).
If d < min{n
2
− θ, |n − 3θ|, θ − 1}, or if d < {θ − n
2
, |2n − 3θ|, n − θ − 1}, then
M = Mσ ◦ pi for some σ ∈ k.
Proof. Assume Df(Ma, pix) + Df(pia,Mx) = ΛMDf(pia, pix) holds true. Then,
we have two cases.
1.) θ < n
2
By [17, Theorem 3], we are done.
2.) θ > n
2
















= L−1θ ΛMDf(pia, pix)
Let Lθ represent the map that raises terms to the θ
th power. We can use
the definition of the discrete differential to expand the left hand side of the
equation. By linearity, we can distribute the exponent q−θ to each term. After
applying our lemma we get the following,
f˜(Ma+pix)+f˜(Ma)+f˜(pix)+f˜(pia+Mx)+f˜(pia)+f˜(Mx) = L−1θ ΛMDf(pia, pix)
By adding 0 = 2f˜(0) to the left and applying I = LθL
−1
θ to the right we get,
Df˜(Ma, pix) +Df˜(pia,Mx) = L−1θ ΛM(LθL
−1
θ )Df(pia, pix)
And by the lemma we have,
Df˜(Ma, pix) +Df˜(pia,Mx) = L−1θ ΛMLθDf˜(pia, pix)
We now have a relation on f˜(x) where −θ + d < n
2
. Now we can apply [17,
Theorem 3] to conclude that M = Mσ ◦ pi for some σ ∈ k.

We note that the existence of a differential symmetry on f ◦ pi implies a
solution of the equation in Theorem 1 as well as the commutativity of Mσ and pi.
Since the commutativity of Mσ and pi requires that pi is L-linear, where Fq ⊆ L ⊆ k
and σ ∈ L, for any nontrivial differential symmetry to exist, (d, n) > 1. Thus, there
is a most desirable value of d from an efficiency and security standpoint: d = 1.
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Let us specifically consider this most desired value d = 1. Then the only































Furthermore, since θ = n
2
always produces a many-to-one map in any characteristic,
the restriction to provably secure parameters for PFLASH eliminates at most four
possible values for θ for all extension degrees n.
5.2 Extension to PFLASH
We now generalize the analysis of the previous section in application to
PFLASH. First we derive a heuristic argument for bootstrapping the provable se-
curity of the composition f ◦ pi to statistical security for the projected primitive.
We then clarify the resistance of PFLASH to analysis as an HFE− scheme. Finally,
we derive security bounds for various PFLASH parameters.
5.2.1 Differential Analysis
As previously mentioned, proof that differential symmetries do not exist for
the central map of a scheme verifies that a differential adversary cannot recover a
full rank key. Such a proof does not, however, verify that a differential adversary
cannot find a symmetry revealing the extension field multiplicative structure and
directly attack the scheme.
To illustrate this principal, imagine a high degree variant of HFE in which
the central map has the form f(x) = xq
θ+1 + pi2(Q(x)) over an extension of degree
2n, where pi2 is a rank n projection onto the complement of the subfield of size q
n
and Q is an arbitrary quadratic. Then any minus variant in which the image of pi2
is the kernel of T is a C∗− public key, but one with multiplicative symmetry. In
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particular, any map L representing muliplication by an element in the intermediate
extension of degree n would satisfy
D(T ◦ f ◦ U)(U−1La, x) +D(T ◦ f ◦ U)(a, U−1Lx) = (Lqθ + L)D(T ◦ f ◦ U)(a, x).
Thus the minus scheme has a multiplicative symmetry even though the original
scheme provably does not. In fact, even more strongly, we have computed functions
of the form of f above over a degree 6 extension of GF (2) for which no linear
differential symmetry of any form exists, but under projection onto the degree 3
subfield, the multiplicative symmetry is exhibited.
In the case of PFLASH, we may attempt the strategy of the previous section
for proving security. We may always model the removal of r equations as the
application of a polynomial pi(x) =
∑r
i=0 aix
qi to the central map. If only a few
equations are removed, then the analysis proceeds just like in [12], because f ◦pi is a
low rank albeit high degree polynomial. Since no parameters suggested for PFLASH
are near this range, however, this analysis does not apply. When we perform this
analysis with r ≈ n
3
and f ◦ pi, however, the methods of the previous section fail to
generate a provably secure class of private keys.
Fortunately, there is an easy heuristic argument revealing a simple relation-
ship between symmetries of the central map and symmetries of a map with the
minus modifier that shows that symmetry should be statistically no more likely for
any minus modified scheme than for the original. Let T ′ be the minus projection
composed with the inclusion mapping with domain Fn−rq and codomain K. Suppose
that T ′ ◦ f ◦ pi has a differential symmetry. Then
D(T ′ ◦ f)(pia,Mx) +D(T ′ ◦ f)(Ma, pix) = ΛMD(T ′ ◦ f)(pia, pix)
T ′ [Df(pia,Mx) +Df(Ma, pix)] = ΛMT ′Df(pia, pix).
Since the left is clearly in T ′K, the right must be as well. Thus, with high prob-
ability, that is, when Spana,x(Df(pia, pix)) = K, we have that ΛMT ′K = T ′K.
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We know from linear algebra that in this case there exists at least one invertible
transformation Λ′M such that ΛMT
′ = T ′Λ′M . Therefore, we obtain the relation
Df(pia,Mx) +Df(Ma, pix) = Λ′MDf(pia, pix) (mod ker(T
′)). (5.1)
Clearly, this argument is not reversible for any Λ′M satisfying (5.1); therefore,
we cannot in general conclude that the scheme with the minus modifier inherits any
differential symmetry from the central map. On the other hand, satisfying (5.1)
imposes n − r constraints on ΛM , while the “commuting” of ΛM with T ′ imposes
another r constraints. Thus, the existence of a symmetry in the minus case imposes
the same number of constraints on ΛM as for the central map and so we expect the
probability of the existence of a differential symmetry to be no higher than for the
central map.
5.2.2 Rank Analysis
One can consider PFLASH to be a high degree version of HFE− by absorbing
the projection of the variables into the central map. Notice that the rank of the
composition is still only two, thus PFLASH must achieve its security from the minus
modifier.
Recently, in [27], a key recovery attack valid for all parameters of HFE− is







In application to PFLASH, there are two things to note about this attack.
First, the attack produces an equivalent HFE− key, not a pC∗− key. This fact may
not limit the attack, because it will still recover a central map of rank two of the
form f ◦pi which we may then attack as a pC∗ scheme in the manner of [28]. Second,
the quantity dlogq(D)e in the complexity estimate is derived from the rank structure
that the degree bound of HFE implies, not directly from the degree bound itself.
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Thus, the rank of the C∗ monomial, which is two, plays the role of dlogq(D)e in the
application of the techniques of [27] to PFLASH.
In fact, instances of PFLASH with quite inappropriate but still large parame-
ters can be broken with this method. In particular we note that for a PFLASH(256, 44, 3, 1)
that the complexity of the attack is roughly estimated 44(3+2+1)ω ∼ 278. For large
values of r, however, such as in all parameter sets in [5], this attack is infeasible. For
example, the smallest parameters suggested in [5] still resist this attack to dozens
of orders of magnitude beyond brute force. Thus, for sensible parameters with r
sufficiently large, PFLASH is secure.
5.2.3 Security Estimates
Now with a refined security analysis, we can eliminate differential attacks for
a larger set of parameters, thus doubling the entropy of the key space for PFLASH.
In addition, with the complexity estimate of O(n(r+3)ω) and practical values of r,
PFLASH is quite secure against the new attack on HFE− schemes. In conjunction
with the invariant analysis of [5], we conclude that the security of PFLASH is
determined by its resistance to algebraic and brute force attacks.
Viewing PFLASH as an HFE− scheme, we may use the bound in [22] to
estimate the degree of regularity of PFLASH. This upper bound can be computed
(q − 1)(R + r)
2
+ 2,
where R is the rank of the central map; in the case of PFLASH, this quantity is
two. Though this is an upper bound, empirical evidence suggests that it is tight for
random systems of rank R. Thus the degree of regularity is far too high for practical
schemes to be weakened. Furthermore, direct algebraic attacks for large schemes
are impractical even with smaller complexity bounds because the space complexity
of the best algorithms are too large to be practical.
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Therefore, we corroborate the claims of [5] that brute force collision attacks
are the greatest threat to PFLASH schemes. The evidence from our increase of
the entropy of the key space and the verification that PFLASH resists recent weak-
nesses revealed in HFE− suggest the security levels in Table 5.1 (all of which are in
agreement with [5]).
Scheme Public Key (B) Security (b)
PFLASH(16, 62, 22, 1) 39,040 80
PFLASH(16, 74, 22, 1) 72,124 104
PFLASH(16, 94, 30, 1) 142,848 128
Table 5.1: Security levels for standard parameters of PFLASH
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CHAPTER 6
EFLASH: A NEW MULTIVARIATE ENCRYPTION SCHEME
Many of the previously discussed multivariate schemes are used as signature
schemes. Recently we have seen new candidates and strategies emerge for mul-
tivariate encryption. Previously, multivariate schemes centered around bijective
functions that map from vector spaces of size n back into a vector space of size n.
The problem with this strategy is that there are not many bijective quadratic maps.
Furthermore, of the maps that do exist, many of these functions were either too
hard to invert, or too easy to invert. The common practice to try to overcome this
downfall was to try to hide an easily invertible function by composing the bijective
function with affine maps.
In 2013, Tao et al. proposed relaxing the bijective condition for the cen-
tral function and replacing it with an injective map with a much larger codomain
in [29]. In theory, this would make hiding the structure of the map while maintain-
ing efficient inversion easier to accomplish. The recent resurgence of multivariate
encryption is due primarily to this change in philosophy. Many schemes have been
proposed along these apparently promising lines.
Some notable schemes that increase the codomain size of the central map-
pings include the ABC Simple Matrix scheme, see [29], which utilizes a large matrix
algebra structure; ZHFE, see [30],which is similar to a high degree version of HFE
with a single variable over the extension; and SRP, see [31], which combines the
Square encryption scheme, Rainbow signature scheme, and Plus method. Although
these schemes appear promising, many of these schemes have subsequently been
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the victims of surprising (if not disabling) cryptanalysis. The attacks on ABC
from [25, 26, 32] work well if the base field is small, and both ZHFE and SRP were
broken in [33] and [34], respectively.
In the following chapter, we will introduce a new multivariate encryption
scheme, EFLASH. Our scheme will be a new parameterization of a projected C∗−.
A major difference between our scheme and PFLASH is the size of the projection.
The size of our projection pi will be much larger.
6.1 Algebraic Structure
We will let n be the number of variables and d > n be the degree of the
extension field over Fq. We will let m ≥ n be the number of equations (m < d)
and denote the number of equations removed by a = d−m. We will compose our
central map f(x) = xq
θ+1 with affine maps S and T from Fdq to Fdq . We let φ be a
vector space isomorphism from Fdq to K, pi be a linear embedding from Fnq to Fdq ,
and τ be a linear projection from Fdq to Fmq .










Our public equations P can be found by computing P = τ ◦ T ◦ φ−1 ◦ f ◦ φ ◦ S ◦ pi.
6.2 Encryption and Decryption
To encrypt a message x, the sender would just compute P (x) = τ ◦T ◦φ−1 ◦
f ◦ φ ◦ S ◦ pi(x) = y to get ciphertext y. To decrypt the message we will take
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advantage of some of the weaknesses that an unmodified C∗ scheme possesses.
To decrypt, we exploit the more efficient method of inversion Patarin devel-
oped in his linearization equations attack from [2].
As shown in 2.2.2, if v = (φ−1 ◦ f ◦ φ)u, then we know there exists a bilinear
relationship between v and u. Let y′ = T ◦ φ−1 ◦ f ◦ φ ◦ S ◦ pi ◦ x, vˆ = T−1 ◦ y′, and
uˆ = S ◦ pi ◦ x.Then, vˆ = (φ−1 ◦ f ◦ φ)uˆ. Thus, we see we have a bilinear relationship
between our plaintext and ciphertext variable. This tells us there is a system of d










in the coefficients of u and v which are simultaneously zero.
Given access to the private key the calculation of this bilinear relation is
immediate. Adding the linearization equations to the private key can be considered
a drawback as it increases the private key size, but is an important aspect for our
algorithm.
Inversion, given the ciphertext y, is then accomplished by concatenating
every possible suffix ya to discover y
′ = y||ya. Success is determined by solving the
affine system in x induced from the linearization equations upon input y′. If the
affine system has a solution, x, we can be assured that P (x) = y.
6.3 Decryption Failure Rate
We want to find the probability that there are multiple preimages of y under
τ , which would result in a decryption failure. Specifically, we want to compute
the probability that x1, x2, y ∈ Fq exists such that P (x1) = P (x2) = y, given that
P (x1) = y. Given our function P (x) = τ ◦T ◦φ−1◦f ◦φ◦S ◦pi(x), it is clear that the
only part of this function that is not injective is τ, and that pi is the only additional
map that is not bijective. Thus we compute the probability of decryption failure
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under the simplifying heuristic that the central map Pˆ (x) = T ◦φ−1 ◦ f ◦φ ◦S(x) is
a random bijection. This assumption is obviously false as f is a quadratic map, but
we believe this heuristic to be statistically useful. Let A = image(pi), |A| = qn. We
can consider B to be the preimage of y under τ , so under our simplifying heuristic
B is a random set of qa elements from Fdq .
We will use Bernoulli trials to estimate the probability that y is the image
of at least two distinct elements of Fnq , given that it is the image of at least one. If







The probability of Pˆ (x) ∈ B is qa
qd
= q−m, and the probability that Pˆ (x) is
not in B is 1− q−m. Thus we compute:
Pr(|A ∩B| ≥ 2 | |A ∩B| ≥ 1) = Pr(|A ∩B| ≥ 2)




Pr(|G ∩ τ−1(y)| = 0) + Pr(|G ∩ τ−1(y)| = 1)
)
1− Pr(|G ∩ τ−1(y)| = 0)
Therefore we find Pr(|A∩B| ≥ 2 | |A∩B| ≥ 1) to be p = 1−(1−q−m)q
n−qn−m(1−q−m)qn−1
1−(1−q−m)qn .
To find an upper bound for the probability p, we find an upper bound for the nu-























(i)!(a−i)!qim , so we will prove the claim by showing the denominator of
the left hand side is larger than the denominator of the right hand side.
Clearly (i + 1)! > i!, and q(i+1)m > qim by a factor of qm. We see that
(a − i − 1)! < (a − i)! by a factor of a − i, but we know that a − i < a < qm.









(q−im) when a < qm.
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Bounding the numerator: 1− (1− q−m)qn − qn−m(1− q−m)qn−1 .
Using binomial coefficients and the above claim, we see that:








q−2m − · · · ) ≥ 1− qnq−m.
Thus 1− (1− q−m)qn ≤ 1− (1− qn−m).
By the same argument, we are given:








q−2m − · · · ) ≥ 1− (qn − 1)q−m.
Therefore, −qn−m(1− q−m)qn−1 ≤ −qn−m(1− (qn − 1)q−m). Thus the numerator is
bounded above by 1− (1− qn−m)− qn−m(1− (qn − 1)q−m).
Bounding the denominator: 1 − (1 − q−m)qn Similar to our argument for
bounding the numerator, we will use binomial coefficients and claim 1 to find:

















Hence the denominator is bounded below by 1− (1− qn−m + qnqn−1
2
q−2m).
Finding a bound for the probability, p
p =
1− (1− q−m)qn − qn−m(1− q−m)qn−1
1− (1− q−m)qn
≤ 1− (1− q
n−m)− qn−m(1− (qn − 1)q−m)




1− 1 + qn−m − qn−m + qn−m(qn − 1)q−m


















When q = 2, empirical evidence shows we can approximate this by 2n−m−1.
The data to support this claim are shown in Table 7.1.
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q n d a m n−m decrypt fail rate
2 14 34 8 26 −12 2−13.13
2 14 35 8 27 −13 2−13.94
2 14 36 8 28 −14 2−14.94
2 14 37 8 29 −15 2−15.94
2 14 38 8 30 −16 2−17.64
Table 6.1: Probability of decryption failure for specific parameters of EFLASH.
6.4 Resistance to Known Attacks
The security analysis of EFLASH is quite related to that of PFLASH because
of the similar algebraic structure. There are three attack methods that must be
considered. Since the scheme requires more equations than variables to ensure a
low probability of decryption failure, we require a careful analysis of the direct
algebraic attack to ensure that the degree of regularity of the scheme is not too
low. Second, in light of the attack on HFE- schemes, see [9], we require a MinRank
analysis. Finally, given the history of the lineage of the C∗ family, we require an
analysis of symmetric differential methods.
6.4.1 Algebraic Attack
The first relevant attack for EFLASH is the direct algebraic attack. Al-
gebraically, EFLASH is a high degree projected HFE- scheme, in the sense that
EFLASH has a low Q-rank like HFE. Applying a projection to the input variables
cannot increase the Q-rank, so we analyze the Q-rank of the central map composed
with the minus modifier.
The key observation is that, unlike the case of HFE in which removing one
equation in general increases the Q-rank by one, since the quadratic form associated
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with the central map is so sparse, the removal of one equation in general increases the
rank by two. To see this, note that the coefficients of the quadratic form associated
with HFE are restricted to a square submatrix whose size is typically the Q-rank
of the map. A codimension one projection allows these coefficients to bleed into
another row and column, which increases the size of the square by one. In contrast,
the size of the smallest square containing the nonzero values in the quadratic form
of the EFLASH central map is usually much larger than the Q-rank of EFLASH;
in fact, the codimension one projection can produce two elements in original rows
and columns, see Figure 7.1.
Figure 6.1: The shape of the matrices representing the central maps of HFE- and
C∗−. The darkly shaded regions represent nonzero values of the central map with-
out the minus modifier, the lightly shaded regions represent new nonzero values
introduced by the removal of one equation. Unshaded areas have coefficients of
zero.
Thus, the central map of EFLASH has Q-rank 2 + 2a. By the formula
provided in [22], we compute an upper bound on the degree of regularity,
dreg ≤ (q − 1)(a+ 1) + 2. (6.1)
When q is small this bound is known to be fairly tight. The complexity of the






2 ≤ ω ≤ 3 is the linear algebra constant.
Experiments were conducted on some small scale instances of EFLASH to
study the behavior of the degree of regularity for values of n and m = d − a of a
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similar ratio to a full sized scheme with a low decryption failure rate. The results
are shown in Table 6.2.
n d a m dreg dreg (RANDOM)
16 28 9 19 4 4
24 37 9 28 4 5
32 47 9 38 5 6
40 56 9 47 ≥ 6 7
Table 6.2: The degree of regularity of small scale EFLASH parameters in comparison
to that of random systems of the same size.
The data show that the degree of regularity grows with the size of the system
when a is fixed. Until our resource permissions were limited on the machine, each
sufficiently large system exhibited a degree of regularity at most one less than that
of a random system. We do not have a solid theoretical argument for why the degree
of regularity should be bounded thusly; however, for the sizes of schemes necessary
to achieve security, the upper bound provided by Equation (6.1) is already strictly
less than the degree of regularity of random systems of the same size.
6.4.2 MinRank Attack
We can denote the calculations used to find our public equations P as matrix
multiplications. Let F∗i be the matrix representation of the ith Frobenius power of
the central map f . Then the matrix F∗0 represents our central map f , and is
the d × d matrix with 1’s in the (0, θ) and (θ, 0) coordinates and zeros elsewhere.
Matrices S and T are d×d affine maps. We can also consider pi as a linear embedding
from (Fq)n to (Fq)d, and τ as a linear projection from (Fq)d to (Fq)m. Let σ be a
primitive element of the extension, and thus {1, σ, σ2, . . . , σd−1} is a basis vector
over Fq. Then mappings of φ and φ−1 can be represented as multiplication of Md
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and M−1d , respectively, where
Md =

1 1 . . . 1
σ σq . . . σq
d−1
...
... . . .
...
σd−1 σ(d−1)q . . . σ(d−1)q
d−1







Notice that τ ∗ : (Fq)d → (Fq)d. We will call P ∗ := τ ∗ ◦ T ◦ φ−1 ◦ f ◦ φ ◦S ◦ pi.
P and P ∗ will be comprised of the same m public equations, but P ∗ will then have
a rows of 0 appended to it.
Consider R = φ ◦ τ ∗ ◦ T ◦ φ−1. Then R : Fqd → Fqd is Fq-linear. If we
let τ˜(x) = Πr∈ker(R)(x − r), then we know by proposition 2 in [12], there exists a
nonsingular linear map R˜ from Fqd to Fqd such thatRx = R˜τ˜x. Let T˜ = φ−1◦R˜◦τ˜◦φ.
This brings us to the following claim.
Claim 3. P ∗(x) = τ ∗ ◦ T ◦ φ−1 ◦ f ◦ φ ◦ S ◦ pix = T˜ ◦ φ−1 ◦ f ◦ φ ◦ S ◦ pix
Proof.
T˜ ◦ φ−1 ◦ f ◦ φ ◦ S ◦ pi = φ−1 ◦ R˜ ◦ τ˜ ◦ φ ◦ φ−1 ◦ f ◦ φ ◦ S ◦ pi
= φ−1 ◦ R˜ ◦ τ˜ ◦ f ◦ φ ◦ S ◦ pi (∗)
= φ−1 ◦R ◦ f ◦ φ ◦ S ◦ pi
= φ−1 ◦ φ ◦ τ ∗ ◦ T ◦ φ−1 ◦ f ◦ φ ◦ S ◦ pi
= τ ∗ ◦ T ◦ φ−1 ◦ f ◦ φ ◦ S ◦ pi
= P ∗
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Now, let us reconsider (∗). We know that our public key is equivalent to (∗),
so we see that
P ∗ = φ−1 ◦ R˜ ◦ τ˜ ◦ f ◦ φ ◦ S ◦ pi
= φ−1 ◦ R˜ ◦ φ ◦ φ−1 ◦ τ˜ ◦ f ◦ φ ◦ S ◦ pi
= T̂ ◦ φ−1 ◦ fˆ ◦ φ ◦ S ◦ pi
Where fˆ is our new central map and fˆ = τ˜ ◦ f and T̂ = φ−1 ◦ R˜ ◦φ. We now
consider F̂∗i to be the ith Frobenius power of the new central map fˆ = τ˜ ◦ f . If we
denote h = φ−1 ◦ fˆ ◦ φ, then we can find symmetric matrices (H1, . . . ,Hd) ∈ (Fq)d
such that hi = xHix
>. As shown in [11] we see,
(H1, . . . ,Hd) = (MdF̂




If we denote the public key by P = (g1, g2, . . . , gm)
>, then we can consider the
symmetric matrices (G1,G2, . . . ,Gm) that correspond to the public polynomials,
such that gi = xGix. By analysis in [11] we find,
(G1, . . . ,Gm) = (piSMdF˜
∗0M>dS
>pi>, . . . , piSMdF˜∗(d−1)M>dS
>pi>)M−1d T˜ (6.3)
When we consider our original central map, we saw that F∗0 has rank 2.
Looking at our new central map fˆ , we see that τ˜ increases the rank. If we insist
that θ is between a+ 1 and d− a− 1, then F̂∗0 has rank 2(a+ 1).
Notice that the embedding pi : (Fq)n → (Fq)d, and the affine map S will not
increase the rank of the right hand side of (6.3), so it will not affect our MinRank
attack. Applying T̂ normally does increase the rank, but it does not increase the
min-Q-rank because it just produces new linear combinations of these matrices.







) ≤ 2(a+ 1)
By the analysis in [35] and [36], the complexity of solving MinRank with





, where dreg is the degree of regularity of the
minors system and ω is the linear algebra constant. Treating EFLASH as a special
case of HFE-, we may derive the degree of regularity of the minors system from [9,
Conjecture 2] by using the Q-rank in place of the sum of the logarithm of the
degree bound and the number of equations removed . Then we may estimate that
the degree of regularity of the minors system is dreg = 2a+ 3.
6.4.3 Discrete Differential Attack
In Chapter 5 it is shown that almost all parameters of PFLASH are secure
against differential adversaries. The proof relies on the fact that the corank of the
projection is relatively small. Since EFLASH uses a corank d − n projection, the
security proof does not apply and so we must use other arguments.
By the symmetric argument to that in [9], we can express pi under the ap-
propriate basis as a polynomial in K of degree qd−n. Thus, the central quadratic
form can be considered a quadratic form in the d − n “variables” pi(x)qi , for 0 ≤
i ≤ d − n. In characteristic two, there are at least as many linearly independent






dent quadratic monomials in pi(x)q
i
, for 0 ≤ i ≤ d− n over K.
We expect that the locus of stabilizing pairs of matrices is zero-dimensional
over K, though it is necessarily positive dimensional over Fq since scalar multiples
induce symmetry for any map. We performed experiments and found that the
solution space was zero-dimensional over K in all cases. We conclude that the space
of linear maps inducing symmetry on EFLASH is too small to be exploited like in
63
the attack on SFLASH of [37].
6.5 Parameter Selection
In choosing parameters for EFLASH, we need to consider security against the
direct algebraic attack, the MinRank attack, and fault attacks exploiting decryption
failure. We address the constraints each of these attacks places on parameters, as
well as efficiency concerns.
The complexity of both the direct attack and the MinRank attack is directly
related to the Q-rank of the public key. In the case of very small fields, such
as GF(2), the degree of regularity is little larger than the Q-rank, 2a + 2; thus,
several equations must be removed to achieve security. Over GF(2), each increase
in a doubles decryption time while making the direct attack approximately n times
harder and the MinRank attack approximately 2m times harder.
To address decryption failures, we note that the probability estimate of Sec-
tion 6.3 is approximately qn−m−1. We set a reasonable bound 2−B on the probability
of decryption failure and may set m = n+ B
lg(q)
to achieve this bound.
For larger q, the MinRank attack seems to be the most concerning. For
efficiency reasons, it is impractical to have a large a; therefore, an instance with
large q is vulnerable to MinRank. For this reason, we recommend the choice q = 2
with a and n sufficiently large to resist the algebraic attack. Our specific parameter
selections for classical security levels are summarized in Table 6.3.It is important to
note that our implementation is a proof of concept, and not at all optimized. This
is a magma implementation, and we are only using one core.
In principle, Grover search should affect the security of these schemes, but
at this time we are not aware of a result that indicates a Grover search would be
feasible for such large parameters. It is possible that Grover search could halve the
64
Scheme Security Public Key Enc. Dec. Dec.
B (ms) (ms) Failure
EFLASH(2, 80, 101, 5) 80-bit 38892 0.7 194 2−17
EFLASH(2, 134, 159, 9) 128-bit 169613 1.3 12758 2−17
Table 6.3: Parameters and unoptimized performance of EFLASH(q, n, d, a) at the
80-bit and 128-bit classical security levels.
dimension of the preimage search space. Thus, we may have to roughly double the
size of the plaintext. To protect against the possible threat of Grover search we
consider the parameter selections shown in Table 6.4.
On the other hand, we may consider the possibility of the cryptosystem
being implemented on a quantum device so that the search step in decryption may
be Groverized. Therefore Grover’s algorithm may, in fact, improve efficiency.
Scheme Security Public Key Enc. Dec. Dec.
B (ms) (ms) Failure
EFLASH(2, 160, 181, 5) 80-bit 141691 1.9 1140 2−17
EFLASH(2, 256, 279, 7) 128-bit 559249 5.3 16177 2−17
Table 6.4: Parameters and unoptomized performance of EFLASH(q, n, d, a) at the
80-bit and 128-bit quantum security levels.
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CHAPTER 7
ALL IN THE C∗ FAMILY
Section 2.2.3 introduces some of the modifiers that have been proposed to
try to secure C∗ schemes. In this chapter we will look at each of these modifiers
in more detail, and consider new combinations of them. We will start by reviewing
the modifiers, and introducing the notation we will use throughout the chapter.
One such modifier is the minus modifier (−), which eliminates a equations
from the public key. The plus modifier (+) adds p random equations to the public
key. Another modifier introduced is the projection modifier (p). The idea of pro-
jection is to fix the value of d− n input variables. We call the codimension of this
projection t := d− n.
The vinegar modifier (v) adds extra variables into the public key that can
be assigned random values upon inversion. The effect of adding vinegar variables is
that new quadratic terms, formed from both products of vinegar variables and C∗
variables and products among vinegar variables, increase the Q-rank of the public
key, that is, its rank as a quadratic form over K. Vinegar variables are typically
applied to Hidden Field Equation (HFE) schemes, as discussed in Chapter 4.
The final modifier we will discuss is internal perturbation (ip). For this
modifier, we will consider a public key P : Fnq → Fmq . We will denote the ith equation
of the public key as pi, and plain-text vector x := (x1, x2, . . . , xn) ∈ Fnq . Consider an
affine map S : Fnq → Fsq, and denote z := S(x). Additionally, consider Q : Fsq → Fmq
to be a set of m quadratic equations, where qi denotes the i
th. equation. We can
create the internally perturbed public key P˜ by defining p˜i(x) = pi(x) + qi(z) for
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each 0 < i ≤ m. The support dimension of (ip) will be denoted as s.
7.1 Known Combinations of Modifiers
The unmodified C∗ scheme is easy to attack with the help of hindsight and
twenty years of serious development in multivariate cryptography. Not only is C∗
vulnerable to Patarin’s linearization equations attack of [2], the scheme is also weak
against differential methods such as [38], can be broken by finding the extension
field structure via the techniques of [37] and is easily defeated by MinRank methods
such as [11].
Several attempts at encryption and signatures derived from C∗ have been
proposed over the years using the modifiers of the previous section. Each of the
modifiers has a critical weakness. The minus modifier is vulnerable to differential
cryptanalysis as the practical attack on SFLASH of [39] shows. The plus modifier
does not increase the MinRank of the scheme and so MinRank attacks are effective
and reveal the output basis, breaking the scheme. The projected C∗ scheme is still
vulnerable to a differential attack as shown in [28], as is the internally perturbed C∗
scheme, see [38]. The vinegar variant transforms C∗ into a particularly bad HFEv
scheme unless some hack making it similar to (ip) is applied. Interestingly, none of
the modifiers alone are sufficient to secure C∗.
Combinations of these modifiers have seen some greater success. After the
attack in [38] of the original PMI scheme of [40], an ipC∗ scheme, PMI+, proposing
the combination of the (ip) and (+) modifiers was presented in [41]. Similarly,
PFLASH and EFLASH use both the projection and minus modifieres.
We present in Appendix II a summary of the security properties of C∗
schemes with various combinations of modifiers. For brevity we are not exhaus-
tive, and as a general rule it seems that combinations of modifiers each of which are
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weak against attack A tend to remain weak against attack A.
Two things are important to note about this summary. First is that there is
a notable exception to the rule of the previous paragraph. While it has been shown
that pC∗ schemes and C∗− schemes are both vulnerable to differential attacks,
it was proven in [17] and generalized in [42] that the combination of projection
with the minus modifier renders C∗ invincible from differential attacks. Thus the
combination (p-) is resistant to differential adversaries though (p) and (-) are weak.
Second, resistance to these attack models is typically not binary but parameterized
by the modifier. In particular, though the (ip) modifier provides resistance to
MinRank attacks, the original parameters of PMI+ are easily broken by a simple
modification of [11] and still larger parameters can be defeated by the new MinRank
techniques developed in [43]. (Embarrassingly, we can find no reference to either
such attack on PMI+.) We will revisit this analysis in Section 7.3 where we will
generalize the analysis of the family of C∗ schemes to the full array of possible
schemes with all of their parameters.
7.2 The C∗ Schema
In this section, we describe a C∗ construction that is as general as possible
using the modifiers of the previous section. We parameterize this generalized C∗
scheme with the values:
• n, number of variables
• d, degree of extension
• s, support dimension of the (ip) modifier
• a, number of public equations removed
• p, number of plus polynomials
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• t, corank of projection (d− n)
We call the resulting scheme a (n, d, s, a, p, t) scheme.
The only modifier whose use we do not consider in the C∗ framework is the
vinegar modifier, (v). Directly applying the vinegar modifier produces a degenerate
HFEv scheme, since inversion must be accomplished via Berlekamp’s Algorithm,
see [8], or something similar. We do not consider this modifier as a C∗v scheme would
be no better performing than an HFEv scheme, while the C∗v would have a smaller
key space and worse security properties. Moreover, since the direct application of
the vinegar modifiers results in an inversion process that does not use the structure
of the C∗ map, we do not consider this a C∗ scheme, but rather a bad HFE scheme.
Let K be a degree d extension of Fq and let φ : Fdq → K be an Fq-vector space
isomorphism. Let U : Fnq → Fnq be an invertible Fq-affine map, let Lt : Fnq → Fdq be
a corank t embedding, let S : Fnq → Fsq be the projection onto the first s coordinates
and let T : Fd+pq → Fd+p−aq be a full rank Fq-affine map.
Define fc : Fnq → Fdq by
fc = φ
−1 ◦ f ◦ φ ◦ Lt,
where f : K→ K is given by f(X) = Xqθ+1. Further, let fip : Fnq → Fdq be given by
fip = Q ◦ S,
where Q : Fsq → Fdq is a random quadratic. Finally, let fp : Fnq → Fpq be a random
quadratic.
The central map is constructed as
F = (fc + fip)‖fp.
























Remark 1. We note that since φ is a parameter of the system, that the choice of
φ amounts to a choice of basis for K over Fq and that Lt is random, the choice of
defining fip using only the first s variables still captures the full generality of the
(ip) modifier.
The degree of the extension field d is a parameter that can vary widely
depending on the application. For most studied signature schemes of this type,
d = n. For encryption, it is viable to allow d to be much larger than n, as is the
case for EFLASH, see [44].
Inversion of the public map given the private key is straightforward. First,
at key generation, compute the image of fip so that its elements can be efficiently
enumerated. Given y ∈ Fd+p−aq , compute the preimage of y under T and parse
each vector as w = w1‖w2 = (w1, . . . , wd)‖(wd+1, . . . , wd+p). For all elements ws ∈
Im(fip) and for all such w1, enumerate all preimages u of w1 + ws under fc. Check
that fip(u) = ws and that fp(u) = w2: if either fails retry with another pair; if
the check succeeds then output U−1(u). All of the details are explicitly provided
in Algorithm 1, which calls on a subroutine to invert the map fc, since this process
can differ depending on whether the scheme is parameterized as a signature or an
encryption scheme.
7.3 Security Analyses of the Schema
Here we consider the known attacks on multivariate schemes and discuss
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Algorithm 1 (n, d, s, a, p, t) scheme Public Key Inversion
Input: T, φ, fc, fip, fp, U
−1, Im(fip) and y ∈ Fd+p−aq .
Output: x such thatP(x) = y.
1: x = ⊥
2: WT ← {w ∈ Fd+pq : T (w) = y}
3: for all w ∈ WT do
4: w1 ← w[1 : d], w2 ← w[d+ 1 : d+ p]
5: for all ws ∈ Im(fip) do
6: wc ← w1 + ws
7: Uc ← Invfc(wc)
8: for all u ∈ Uc do








their application on the general C∗ framework presented in the previous section. In
particular, we discuss what combinations of modifiers prevent attacks and highlight
what modifiers are vulnerable to attack without a companion modifier.
7.3.1 Differential Analysis
Differential symmetry attacks also broke SFLASH, SQUARE and PMI, see
[28,37,38]. The vulnerability of C∗ to the differential symmetric attack is provably
removed with the combination of the projection and minus modifiers as shown
in [5, 17] and generalized in [42]. Thus, for any generalized C∗ scheme with both
the projection and minus modifiers to be vulnerable to such attacks, the additional
modifiers must somehow reintroduce this weakness. Since the remaining modifiers
introduce random coefficients or equations to the central map, the likelihood of
such an occurrence is very remote. In particular, both of the random (ip) and
(+) modifiers move the distribution of (n, d, 0, a, 0, t) schemes towards the uniform
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distribution on quadratic maps in statistical distance. Under the loose heuristic
that the distribution of such (n, d, s, a, p, t) schemes is very close to uniform, we
can derive an approximation of the probability that the result has a differential
symmetry.
To calculate the probability that a random function has a differential sym-
metry, we note that quantified over all quadratic functions, we obtain all possible
differential symmetry relations of the form
DP (Ma, x) +DP (a,Mx) = ΛMDP (a, x). (7.1)
in the unknown coefficients of M and ΛM . We can see that M is being applied
to the plaintext variables a and x, which are vectors of length n. Therefore, M
will be an n× n matrix. Lambda on the other hand, will be applied to the output
variables, and will therefore have dimension d − a + p × d − a + p. So the two
matrices together will have (d − a + p)2 + n2 variables. To determine the number
of equations, it is easier to think about this relationship coordinate wise. If we
denote DPi as the differential of the i
th public key equation, and consider solving
DPi(My, x) + DPi(y,Mx) = ΛMiDP (y, x), we can see that we will have a set of
d − a + p equations. For each coordinate i, we get one equation. But, we can
interpret each equation as a matrix equation, M>DPi + DPiM = ΛMiDP. The
left hand side of the equation will give me a symmetric matrix as DPi is symmetric,
so we only need to test the upper triangular section of the matrix, including the





coordinates. Thus, there are (d− a+ p) times (n+1
2
)




For the sake of caution, we will consider schemes with at most one of the
projection and minus modifiers and at most one of the (ip) and (+) modifiers to
be insecure. The reason is that schemes with at most one of (p) and (-) exhibit a
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form of differential symmetry and it is plausible that statistical techniques similar
to [38] or projection techniques similar to [43] may be effective against (ip) and (+)
modifications of these schemes, respectively.
Thus the space of (n, d, s, a, p, t) schemes resistant to differential attacks are
those with at > 0 or sp > 0.
7.3.2 MinRank
The complexity of MinRank is dependent upon Q-rank, so it is clear that
if we increase the rank, we decrease the effectiveness of the MinRank attack. The
minus modifier increases the rank of the central map. Since the quadratic form
associated with the central map is so sparse, the removal of one equation in general
increases the rank by two. The minus modifier can be viewed as a codimension
one projection, which can produce two elements in original rows and columns, see
Figure 7.1.
Figure 7.1: The shape of the matrix representing the central map of C∗−. The
darkly shaded regions represent nonzero values of the central map without the
minus modifier, the lightly shaded regions represent new nonzero values introduced
by the removal of one equation. Unshaded areas have coefficients of zero.
The projection modifier cannot increase the Q-rank of the central map. Since
we expect the Q-rank of the projected scheme to be the same as the original, we
expect the security of a (n, d, s, a, p, t) scheme against MinRank attacks to be the
same as that of a (n, d, s, a, p, 0) scheme.
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The effect of (ip) depends on the support dimension s. Since the support
dimension of the (ip) summand is s, there is an s dimensional space in which the
(ip) modifier adds extra randomness to the quadratic form F. Under an appropriate
change of basis, all of this contribution can be contained in the upper left s × s
block of F; hence, (ip) increases the Q-rank by at most s. We can apply projections
on the input to try to kill the (ip) support, which once again makes the Q-rank
low. Therefore, techniques similar to [43] may limit the effectiveness of the (ip)
modifier in preventing a MinRank attack, a fact that once again highlights the
close relationship between (ip) and (v).
Finally, the (+) modifier has no effect on min-Q-rank. While any nonzero
linear combination of the (+) polynomials is likely to have a high rank, any linear
combination of the public polynomials that eliminates the contribution of the (+)
polynomials has a rank independent of the (+) modifier. Thus, if the Q-rank of
a (n, d, s, a, 0, t) scheme is sufficiently low, the (+) modifier adds no significant
security; it merely increases the number of equations.
Thus, the Q-rank of a generic (n, d, s, a, p, t) scheme is 2 + 2a + s at most,
and this is a tight bound for most realistic parameters. Thus, we can conclude that
the complexity of a MinRank attack on (n, d, s, a, p, t) schemes is
O
((
d+ a+ p+ s+ 3
3 + 2a+ s
)ω)
≈ O ((d− a+ p)(3+2a+s)ω) .
7.3.3 Algebraic
The complexity of algebraic attacks rely on the degree of regularity, defined
as the smallest degree at which a nontrivial degree fall is generated in the Gro¨bner
basis algorithm. We can find an estimate of the degree of regularity depending on
the Q-rank of the system in [22].
As discussed in the previous section, the Q-rank of a C∗ scheme with a
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equations removed is 2 + 2a. The projection and plus modifier cannot increase
the rank of the central map. Thus we compute an upper bound on the degree of
regularity on a (n, d, s, a, p, t) scheme to be
dreg ≤ (q − 1)(a+ s+ 1) + 2.
We note that dreg monotonically decreases in p, thus we cannot add too many plus
polynomials.
If we are more conservative, we may consider projection attacks such as those
in [43] attempting to eliminate some of the support for the (ip) modifier. We note
that with appropriately chosen parameters, this attack can be rendered no more
effective than the standard algebraic attack.
Therefore, similar to the analysis done in [44], the complexity of the algebraic





, where 2 ≤ ω ≤ 3
is the linear algebra constant.
7.4 Performance Analyses
The performance characteristics of C∗ schemes under various modifiers are
straightforward to derive. There are some significant differences, however, in the
effects of the modifiers when employed for signatures versus encryption. We, thus,
treat each case independently.
7.4.1 Key Size
For a generic (n, d, s, a, p, t) scheme, the derivation of the public key size
is straightforward. There are d − a + p public equations in n variables. Each
















elements from Fq. This observation is not all there is to say about public key size,
however.
The (+) modifier significantly reduces the probability of the existence of a
preimage for an arbitrary element in the codomain of the public key. We may
therefore safely ignore this modifier for digital signature applications.
Similarly, there is a possibility of inversion failure for the public key if the
balance of the projection, minus and plus modifiers is not correctly handled. In
particular, if d is larger than n the chance of failure is high. Therefore, we will
restrict our consideration in the case of signature schemes to (n, n, s, a, 0, t) with t
small and in particular t < a.
For encryption schemes we need the public key to be statistically injective.
To accomplish this goal with modifiers, we either require some redundancy in the
plaintext space or to have a larger codomain than the domain. To allow random
plaintexts, we use a value of d much larger than n. Then inherently a projection
of corank at least t = d − n is required. Since a larger value of t precludes unique
inversion, we are forced to set the parameter t = d− n.
7.4.2 Complexity of Inversion
Inversion of the public key is accomplished with Algorithm 1. From the
algorithm we can see that we have as many as qa+s calls to Invfc, plus as many as
qa+s|ker(Lt)| evaluations of fip and fp, plus a couple of linear algebra operations.
These numbers can vary depending on the parameters and the application.
Consider a (n, d, s, a, 0, t) scheme designed for signatures. With n = d, any
preimage of y has a high probability of producing a valid signature and so it is likely
that very few of the qa such preimages will need to be utilized in the inversion. In
contrast, for an encryption scheme with n far smaller than d, one may have to
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search nearly the entire qa preimages to find the valid plaintext. Similarly, for a
signature scheme, the kernel of Lt may be large, as large as q
t, possibly, whereas for
an encryption scheme it is necessary that Lt is an embedding. Thus, we split into
two cases to consider inversion complexity.
First, we consider inversion for signatures. Under the above assumptions for
valid performance of a (n, d, s, a, p, t) scheme for signatures, we have that n = d,
p = 0, t is small and t < a. Since t is small and evaluation of fip and fp are
extremely efficient, the complexity is dominated by that of Invfc. Since we expect
to only require a few values of w to find a valid inverse, the complexity of this step
is O(qs) times the complexity of Invfc. Using an efficient inversion process based on
linearization equations, the complexity of the latter is O(nω). Thus the complexity
for signature schemes is
O (nωqs) .
In the case of encryption, we assume that d is much larger than n and that
t = d − n. In this case, all of Invfc and fip and fp are evaluated qa+s times, thus,
once again, the complexity of inversion is dominated by that of Invfc. In this case,
however, it is likely that on the order of qa preimages of y under T need to be






7.4.3 Decryption Failure Rate
The decryption failure rate for (n, d, 0, a, 0, t) schemes created with the inten-
tion of encryption is discussed in [44]. Using conditional probabilities and Bernoulli
trials, it was found that the probability, p, that y is the image of at least two distinct
elements of Fnq , given that it is the image of at least one can be approximated by
qn−m, where m = d− a.
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This probability was found under the simplifying heuristic that considered
the Fq−quadratic central maps f to be random injective maps. Considering (ip), we
no longer have the injective property, though the (ip) modifier has a large codomain,
so it is unlikely to have collisions between it and anything else. Therefore, (ip) should
not have an effect on the decryption failure rate because we would just be adding
another random summand. Adding a plus modifier will decrease the decryption
failure rate because it will add extra equations that need to be satisfied.
We can model the central map without the minus modifier as a random func-
tion G : qn → qm̂, where m̂ := d + p − a. We will again use Bernoulli trials, and




ing an analysis equivalent to that in [44], we see that the numerator is bounded by
q2n−2m̂ while the denominator is very close to qn−m̂; thus, a good approximation is
about qn−m̂ = qn+a−d−p. We can see that the plus modifier reduces the probability
of decryption failure approximately by qp, while (ip) has no significant effect on the
failure rate.
We performed a series of experiments on failure rate for (n, d, s, a, p, t) schemes
designed for encryption to investigate the rate of decryption failure relative to vary-
ing parameters d and p, the degree of extension and number of plus polynomials.
The results are reported in Table 7.1. All experiments were performed by encrypting
all possible plaintexts and counting the number of plaintexts producing non-unique
ciphertexts. In every experiment the failure rates follow the above analysis closely
without significant variance.
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q n d a s p m̂ n− m̂ decryption failure rate
2 14 26 4 2 2 24 −10 2−9.62
2 14 26 4 2 3 25 −11 2−10.71
2 14 27 4 2 2 25 −11 2−10.86
2 14 27 4 2 3 26 −12 2−12.23
2 14 28 4 2 2 26 −12 2−11.68
2 14 28 4 2 3 27 −13 2−13.23
Table 7.1: Probability of decryption failure for specific parameters of a
(n, d, s, a, p, t) scheme.
7.4.4 Parameter Spaces for Encryption and Signatures
From Section 7.3, we obtain the following constraints for a 128-bit secure
(n, d, s, a, p, t) scheme.
at+ sp > 0
(d− a+ p)(2+2a+s)ω ≥ 2128
n((q−1)(a+s+1)+2)ω ≥ 2128.
These constraints assure security against differential, MinRank and algebraic at-
tacks, respectively.
For signature schemes with suggested parameters of the form (n, d, s, a, 0, t)





lg(q) bits and a signing
time on the order of nωqs field operations. Both of these quantities seem to be
optimized by making s = 0, having a fairly large, and having t = 1. This choice of
parameters, unsurprisingly, produces the PFLASH scheme. It is interesting to note
that these data also suggest an optimal choice of q for such schemes of 2 or 4.
For encryption schemes of the form (n, d, s, a, p, t), the public key size has the





lg(q) bits while decryption time is around nωqa+s and
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the decryption failure rate is qn+a−d−p. Here there is a much more interesting trade-
off between different strategies. The quantity a + s needs to remain sufficiently
large to provide security but directly impacts the decryption speed. Public key
size is reduced if a is increased while s and p are reduced , however this directly
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APPENDIX I
HFEv and HFEv− Key Check Algorithms
Algorithm 2 HFEvKeyCheck
Input: An HFEv central map f , a flag flg.
Output: Set of indices of coefficients mi of submatrix m00 which
are possibly nonzero in a linear map inducing differential symmetry for
f .
1: for monomial αi,jx
qi+qj in f do
2: Si = {};
3: Sj = {};
4: for monomial with powers r and s in f do
5: Si = Si ∪ {r − j, s− j, i− j + r − s, i− j + s− r};
6: Sj = Sj ∪ {r − i, s− i, j − i+ r − s, j − i+ s− r};
7: end for
8: end for
9: if flg then





Input: An HFEv− central map pi(f), the corank of pi, r.
Output: Set of indices of coefficients mi of submatrix m00 which
are possibly nonzero in a linear map inducing differential symmetry for
pi(f).
1: Call: HFEvKeyCheck(f,1)
2: for all Si do
3: Ti = {};
4: for j from 0 to r − 1 do







Modifier Algebraic Differential Linearization Equation MinRank
(ip) + 0 + +
(-) + 0 + +
(+) - + + 0
(p) - 0 0 0
(v)∗ + + + +
(ip+) - + + +
(+-) + + + +
(p-) +- 1 + +
Table II.1: Resistance of C∗ against attacks under certain modifiers. The table can
be read as probabilities of resistance to the given attack. Thus 0 means that the
modifier(s) provide(s) no security in the attack model, 1 means the modifiers(s)
provide(s) provable security, and + or - mean increases, respectively decreases in





• Algebra. An algebra over a field is a vector space along with a bilinear
product.
• Algebraic Variety. An algebraic variety is the set of solutions of a set of
polynomial equations.
• Basis. The basis of a vector space is a set of linearly independent elements
that span the vector space.
• Codimension The codimension of W ⊆ V is a V is a vector space is
codim(W ) = dim(V )− dim(W ).
• Corank. If an m × n matrix has rank r, then the corank of the matrix is
m− r.
• Coset. For any N ≤ G and any g ∈ G where G is a group, let gN = {gn|n ∈
N} and Ng = {ng|n ∈ N} called respectively a left coset and a right coset of
N in G.
• Degree of Regularity. Although there are many ways to define the degree
of regularity for a set of polynomials, this work will be using the following
definition: the degree of regularity for a system of equations is the degree
of the first degree fall while using the Buchberger algorithm to the compute
Gro¨bner basis.
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• Dimension. The dimension of a vector space is the number of elements in
the basis of the vector space.
• Extension field. If F is a field, then K is an extension field of F if K is a
field and F ⊂ K.
• Field. A field is a set F along with operations multiplication and addition that
satisfy the following properties: associativity, commutativity, the distributive
law, existence of additive identity 0, existence of multiplicative identity 1,
additive inverses, and multiplicative inverses for everything except 0.
• First Isomorphism Theorem. Let f : G → G′ be a surjective homomor-
phism with kernel K.
1. The map f˜ : G/K → G′, defined by f˜(xk) = f(x) for every x ∈ G is
well defined
2. The map f˜ is an isomorphism






• Graph Isomorphism Problem (GI). The Graph Isomorphism Problem is
the problem of determining whether two finite graphs are isomorphic.
• Group. A group consists of set and an operation such that the operation
satisfies closure, associativity, identity and invertibility.
• Hilbert’s Nullstellensatz: Let F be a field and K and algebraically closed
extension field. Let I be an ideal of the polynomial ring F[X1, . . . , Xn], and let
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V (I) be the algebraic set of the ideal, defined such that ∀x ∈ V (I), f(x) = 0,
for every f ∈ I. If some polynomial p ∈ F[X1, . . . , Xn] vanishes on V (I)
(meaning p(x) = 0 for all x ∈ V (I)), then there exists a natural number r
such that pr ∈ I.
• Ideal. Let R be a ring. A subset I of R is called a left (respectively right or
2 sided) ideal of R if the following conditions hold:
1. 0 ∈ I
2. x, y ∈ I ⇒ x+ y ∈ I
3. r ∈ R, x ∈ I ⇒ rx ∈ I
• Irreducible Polynomial. A nonconstant polynomial f is said to be irre-
ducible over a field F if it cannot be factored into a polynomial of lower degree.
• Minimal polynomial. The minimal polynomial of an element α is the poly-
nomial f of lowest degree such that f(α) = 0.
• Monic. A polynomial is said to be monic if the leading coefficient is 1.
• Nonsingular. A square matrix is nonsingular if the matrix has a multi-
plicative inverse (i.e., is invertible). A square matrix is nonsingular when the
determinate is nonzero
• Normal Subgroup. A subgroup H ⊆ G is normal if the left and right cosets
of H in G are equal, i.e., gH = Hg for all g ∈ G
• NP , NP -complete. A decisional problem belongs to the class NP if, given
a witness (an example where the problem’s answer is yes), we can check that
the answer is correct in polynomial time. Stands for “non-deterministic poly-
nomial time”. If you have a problem where a witness can be checked in
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polynomial time, and a known NP problem can be solved using the given
problem with modified input, then your problem is NP -complete.
• P -space. A decisional problem belongs to the class P if there is a polynomial-
time algorithm that solves any solves any instance of the problem in polyno-
mial time. Note, P ⊆ NP .
• Polynomial ring. A polynomial ring over a field F in the variables [X1, X2, . . . , Xn],
denoted F[X], consists of all finite sums of products of powers of X1, . . . , Xm
with coefficients in F.
• Primitive Element. If the field K is generated by a single element α over
F, K = F(α), then α is the primitive element of that extension.
• Projection. A projection on a vector space V is a linear operator P : V 7→ V
such that P 2 = P (i.e., P is idempotent).
• Quotient Group. Let N be a normal subgroup of G. We define the set G/N
to be the set of all left cosets of N in G, i.e., G/N = {aN : a ∈ G}. We define
an operation on G/N as (aN)(bN) = (ab)N . The set G/N together with the
defined operation forms the quotient group of G by N .
• Ring. A ring is a set R along with two binary operators + and × that sat-
isfy additive associativity, additive commutativity, additive identity, additive
inverse, distributivity, and multiplicative associativity.
• Singular. A square matrix is singular if the matrix has no multiplicative
inverse (i.e., is not invertible). Thus, a square matrix is singular when the
determinate is equal to zero.
• Standard Basis. The standard basis of the space containing K−dimensional
vectors is a basis composed of vectors that have one entry equal to 1 and the
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remaining K − 1 entries equal to 0.
• Support. The support of a function f : A→ B is the set of elements x ∈ A
such that f(x) 6= 0.
• Vector Space. A vector space is a set that is closed under finite vector
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